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THE ACTAVIS INFERENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 




In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered “reverse 
payment” settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a 
settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the 
alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The 
Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if 
the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is 
the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, 
combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to 
consumers from lessened competition. 
This paper is an effort to assist courts and counsel in implementing 
the Actavis Inference. First, we evaluate a variety of fact patterns that 
have arisen in the district courts since Actavis, including payment that 
takes a form other than cash. For example, a branded drug maker may 
promise not to offer an authorized generic drug. As we explain, under 
Actavis, such agreements are especially likely to violate antitrust law. We 
also consider how much detail a plaintiff must offer in its initial 
complaint to comply with federal pleading requirements. 
                                                                                                                             
†  Aaron Edlin is the Richard Jennings Professor of Law and Professor of Economics 
at the University of California at Berkeley, and Research Associate, National Bureau of 
Economic Research; Scott Hemphill is the Caryl Louise Boies Visiting Professor of Law at 
New York University and Professor of Law (on leave) at Columbia University; Herbert 
Hovenkamp is the Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa; Carl 
Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business 
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consultants and possible expert witnesses in antitrust cases involving reverse payments; 
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Second, we demonstrate that the Actavis Inference fully applies when 
multiple generic firms, rather than just one, threaten to enter the 
market. Our economic model shows that the Actavis Inference becomes 
stronger and more important in the presence of multiple generic firms. 
Our analysis demonstrates that the contrary conclusions reached in a 
recent paper by Bruce Kobayashi, Joshua Wright, Douglas Ginsburg, and 
Joanna Tsai (“KWGT”) are incorrect, inconsistent with KWGT’s own 
analysis, or irrelevant to a faithful implementation of Actavis. 
Third, we clarify the reasons not to litigate patents in antitrust cases. 
Thanks to the Actavis Inference, a trial court need not determine patent 
validity or infringement in order to assess the legality of the settlement. 
The antitrust question depends upon the ex ante prospects in patent 
litigation and not ex post litigation of the patent by a patent court or by 
the antitrust court considering the settlement. Litigating the patent is 
thus of limited probative value and not dispositive regarding a potential 
antitrust violation.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court considered the proper 
antitrust treatment of a payment made by a patent owner to an alleged 
infringer in settlement of their infringement litigation, wherein the 
alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market until some date prior to 
the expiration of the patent. The Court held that such “reverse payment” 
settlements are illegal if the patent holder is paying to avoid 
competition.2 Such settlements are fairly called “pay-for-delay” 
settlements. The Court held, however, that not all reverse payment 
settlements are presumed to be illegal, rejecting the FTC position, 
because they do not all necessarily involve payment for delay.3 The 
question is when a court can reasonably infer that a reverse payment is a 
payment for delay, or in other words, a payment to avoid competition. 
While most settlements of patent infringement disputes raise no 
antitrust issues, pay-for-delay settlements differ in important ways. In 
most traditional settlements, the defendant pays the patentee a royalty 
and produces under the patent. Production licenses are expressly 
authorized by the Patent Act. Even production licenses that contain 
limitations on the licensee’s output are lawful most of the time, even if 
                                                                                                                             
1. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
2. Id. at 2236 (“[T]he payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the 
risk of competition. And, as we have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant 
anticompetitive harm.”). 
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made outside the litigation context. They are a form of technology 
sharing that presumptively increases overall output. By contrast, a pay-
for-delay settlement does not involve a license at all, but at most a 
promise to license at some future time. Pending that, it is simply a naked 
market division agreement. 
Secondly, in conventional patent litigation the plaintiff and defendant 
are adverse on issues of validity, infringement, and remedy. The plaintiff 
has a strong interest in having validity and infringement established, 
while the defendant has a strong but opposite interest. By contrast, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s provision forbidding entry by third firms until 180 
days after the defendant (generic) produces—even when the defendant 
chooses not to produce as part of the settlement—gives the parties a 
strong joint incentive to use a settlement to delay the entry of follow-on 
generic producers.4 The joint maximizing position for them is to preserve 
patent exclusivity for as long as possible, but share the proceeds. The 
only issue on which they have adversity is the size of the payment, which 
is simply a wealth transfer between the two of them. The more likely the 
patent is to be invalid or not infringed, all else equal, the larger that 
payment will be. 
According to Actavis, the trial court need not determine validity or 
infringement of the patent in order to assess the legality of a reverse 
payment settlement under the antitrust laws.5 Unlawfulness requires a 
reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition, 
which can be established by identifying a large and otherwise 
unexplained payment of cash or something else of value made by the 
patent holder to the alleged infringer in exchange for that firm’s 
agreement not to enter the market for some period of time. We call this 
the Actavis Inference. 
So far, these cases have arisen in the pharmaceutical industry, where 
the patent holder (“Brand”) is selling a branded pharmaceutical product 
and the alleged infringer (“Generic”) is planning to offer a bioequivalent 
generic drug. In this context, the Actavis Inference enables the courts to 
infer that a large, otherwise unexplained transfer of value from Brand to 
                                                                                                                             
4. In an ordinary patent case, if an alleged infringer agrees to leave a market or 
delay entry as part of a patent settlement, other firms that think the patent weak may still 
enter, potentially eliminating the gains from delay. In contrast, under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the FDA will not approve a third party’s application to enter before 180 days 
subsequent to the first generic beginning production. Id. at 2228–29. Third parties therefore 
would find early entry much more difficult in the Hatch-Waxman context which greatly 
increases the joint incentives of the brand and the first generic to agree to delay entry. Id. 
5. Id. at 2236 (“It is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the 
antitrust question . . . .”). In Part V, we explain that litigating the patent would, not in any 
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Generic was made to delay generic entry.6 Part II below briefly sketches 
out the logic behind the Actavis Inference and provides some background 
for our subsequent analysis. 
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Actavis, we 
wrote a paper, Activating Actavis, designed to help the courts and counsel 
implement the Actavis decision.7 We subsequently wrote a second paper, 
Actavis and Error Costs, in response to critics of Activating Actavis.8 Now 
we write again for three reasons.  
First, the passage of time allows us to evaluate how district courts 
have implemented the Actavis Inference and to make recommendations. 
We continue to believe that the Actavis Inference is both important to 
prevent anticompetitive settlements and workable in practice. We expect 
it will take some time for the case law to become settled in this area, 
since a wide variety of fact patterns arise and the Supreme Court left a 
number of issues unresolved. Reverse payment settlements in which 
Brand agrees not to offer a so-called “authorized generic” version of the 
drug in question are of particular concern. As explained in Part III below, 
under Actavis these agreements are especially likely to violate the 
antitrust laws.  
Second, we write to provide additional economic analysis that is 
directly relevant to the Actavis Inference. More specifically, in Part IV we 
present an economic model in which multiple generic firms, rather than 
just one, are threatening to enter the market.9 Many cases involve 
multiple generic (potential) entrants, and the real bite of the Hatch-
Waxman Act is its limitation on multiple entry, so we consider this 
economic analysis important in practice. Our economic model shows that 
the Actavis Inference becomes stronger and more important in the 
presence of multiple generic firms rather than just one generic firm. More 
precisely, we show that the incentive of the patent holder to pay the first 
                                                                                                                             
6. Under the burden shifting analysis applied in King Drug Co. of Florence v. 
Cephalon, Inc., the plaintiff would have the burden to show that the payment was “large,” 
but the burden would then shift to the defendant to show that it was not “unexplained.” No. 
06-CV-1797, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015). The court cited 
the fact that evidence about the explanation is more likely to be in the hands of the 
defendant. Id. Once the defendant has met this burden, the plaintiff could still show that 
the defendant’s proffered justifications were pretextual or defeated by the existence of a less 
restrictive alternative. Id. at *25. 
7. Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Activating 
Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16 [hereinafter Activating Actavis]. 
8. Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Actavis and 
Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2014, at 1 [hereinafter Actavis and 
Error Costs]. 
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generic entrant to delay entry is greater if more generic entrants are 
waiting in the wings. With multiple generic entrants, a large reverse 
payment is even more likely to be made in exchange for limiting 
competition, because competition is even more to be feared. This analysis 
demonstrates that the contrary conclusions reached in a recent paper by 
Bruce Kobayashi, Joshua Wright, Douglas Ginsburg, and Joanna Tsai 
(“KWGT”)10 are incorrect, inconsistent with KWGT’s own analysis, or 
irrelevant to a faithful implementation of Actavis.  
Third, we clarify the reasons not to litigate patent validity in the 
antitrust case. The Court in Actavis wrote, “[i]t is normally not necessary 
to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question.”11 In Part V, 
we explain that the antitrust question depends upon the ex ante 
prospects in patent litigation and not ex post litigation of the patent by a 
patent court or by the antitrust court considering the settlement. 
Litigating the patent would be of limited probative value and not 
dispositive regarding a potential antitrust violation. This observation is 
particularly important for those cases where the patent has been 
adjudicated. A finding of invalidity or noninfringement, for example, does 
not mean that a patent settlement is anticompetitive; conversely, a 
finding of validity and infringement does not absolve the patent 
settlement of anticompetitive effects. 
II.  THE ACTAVIS INFERENCE 
Justice Breyer’s opinion in Actavis established the Actavis Inference. 
Put simply, in the pharmaceutical context: if Brand pays more than its 
prospective litigation costs to Generic, a firm threatening entry with a 
generic version of the same drug; and if Generic agrees not to offer that 
version for some period of time; then a fact-finder may properly infer that 
such a “large and unexplained”12 payment was made to delay generic 
entry, and hence is anticompetitive. 
One significant holding of Actavis is that a reverse payment 
settlement can be unlawful even though it falls within the “scope of the 
                                                                                                                             
10. Bruce Kobayashi, Joshua Wright, Douglas Ginsburg & Joanna Tsai, Actavis and 
Multiple ANDA Entrants: Beyond the Temporary Duopoly, ANTITRUST, Spring 2015, at 89 
[hereinafter KWGT]. This article is an abridgement of a longer paper bearing the same title 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508094 (Dec. 7, 2014) [hereinafter KWGT Working 
Paper]. Beyond the specific reasons given in Part IV, the KWGT analysis is unhelpful as a 
guide to courts or counsel because it offers a rejection and critique of the Court’s decision in 
Actavis, rather than a faithful implementation of the Court’s instructions. 
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patent.” In the particular case of reverse payment settlements involving 
branded and generic drugs, the “scope” question usually refers to a 
patent’s duration.13 A settlement is said to be within the patent’s scope if 
it permits generic entry at some point prior to the patent’s expiration 
date. The Court held that such agreements are to be assessed under 
antitrust’s rule of reason. Within the rule of reason, anticompetitive 
effect and market power can be inferred from the large payment itself, if 
the payment was larger than the patent holder’s anticipated litigation 
costs.14 That is the essence of the Actavis Inference.15 
In Activating Actavis, we explained at length that the Actavis 
Inference is strongly supported by economic analysis and consistent with 
prior Supreme Court jurisprudence.16 In Actavis and Error Costs, we 
further explained why the Actavis Inference is critical to avoid a 
substantial risk of false negative results, i.e., situations in which 
antitrust plaintiffs would otherwise be unable to challenge 
anticompetitive settlements effectively.17 
The Actavis Inference is important because Brand and Generic have 
very strong incentives to agree to delay entry into the market by the 
generic firm. Delayed entry by Generic preserves Brand’s monopoly. 
Since monopoly profits are greater than the total profits if two or more 
firms are competing, the two firms will maximize their combined profits 
by delaying generic entry until the patent expires, provided antitrust 
                                                                                                                             
13. In general, conduct “outside the scope” of the patent can mean many things, from 
the tying of unpatented goods to overly broad claim constructions or agreements requiring 
the payment of royalties after a patent’s expiration. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of 
Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Michael A. 
Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent Settlement 
Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2012) (assessing the evolution of the test in the 
context of reverse payment settlements, prior to its rejection by the Supreme Court). 
14. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37; see also King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, 
Inc., No. 06-CV-1797, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015), which 
followed this inference, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the size of the payment 
must be assessed “in comparison to the brand manufacturer’s expected monopoly profits in 
the absence of generic competition.” Id. at *56. Rather, the court followed the plaintiffs’ 
suggestion “that a reverse payment is sufficiently large if it exceeds saved litigation costs 
and a reasonable jury could find that the payment was significant enough to induce a 
generic challenger to abandon its patent claim.” Id. at *56–58. It then denied summary 
judgment on evidence that the avoided litigation costs did not exceed $13 million but the 
payment was much larger. 
15. Defendants in one post-Actavis case have nevertheless argued that “delay” 
requires a delay past the patent’s expiration. The district court correctly rejected that 
argument. See United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, 
Inc., No. 14-MD-02521, 2014 WL 6465235, at *8–11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014) (denying 
motion to dismiss premised on mere fact of entry prior to patent expiration). 
16. Activating Actavis, supra note 7. 
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allows them to do so. Since generic entry greatly erodes the branded 
firm’s profits, the incentives to enter into such an anticompetitive 
agreement can be very strong. Such an agreement would deny consumers 
any possibility of competition during the lifetime of the patent. The Court 
emphasized that no matter how small the risk of invalidity or 
noninfringement, a patent holder who pays to avoid that risk violates 
antitrust law: 
The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of 
course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large 
payment. But, be that as it may, the payment (if otherwise 
unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition. And, 
as we have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant 
anticompetitive harm.18  
The Court identified a large and unexplained payment as a 
suspicious act that suggests the patent holder is paying to limit 
competition. 
By contrast, the Actavis dissenters would have approved any 
settlement within the scope of the patent.19 As they observed, such an 
agreement would be no worse from consumers’ perspective than a 
determination that the patent was valid and could be enforced for the 
remainder of its term.20 Treating all settlements “within the scope of the 
patent”21 as legal under the antitrust laws heavily favors antitrust 
defendants, since the patent might have been found invalid or not 
infringed if the patent case had been litigated. The dissent’s position 
effectively presumes that Brand would have won its case with certainty. 
But as we have argued, that conclusive presumption is inconsistent with 
observing a large payment. If Brand knew for certain that it would win 
                                                                                                                             
18. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. See also In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-MD-
2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634, at *44 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015) (“Large reverse 
payments that are not particularly large in relation to the value of the patent may show 
confidence in the patent, but if they represent payment to avoid the risk of invalidation, 
then they still run afoul of Actavis.”). 
19. Id. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “a patent . . . provides an 
exception to antitrust law, and the scope of the patent—i.e., the rights conferred by the 
patent—forms the zone within which the patent holder may operate without facing 
antitrust liability”). 
20. This point assumes that the patent holder who wins the patent infringement case 
would receive an injunction preventing the infringing firm from practicing the patent for 
the remainder of its term.  
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the patent suit, there would be no reason for Brand to pay the alleged 
infringer more than the Brand’s prospective litigation costs.  
The Actavis Inference provides a relatively clear and direct route by 
which an antitrust plaintiff can establish an inference that a reverse 
payment settlement harms competition and thus violates the antitrust 
laws. However, nothing in Actavis indicates that this is the only route an 
antitrust plaintiff can take. Indeed, Actavis establishes that an antitrust 
plaintiff challenging a patent settlement can prevail by showing that the 
patent holder paid the alleged infringer to delay its entry into the market 
and thereby restrict competition. In some cases this may be possible 
without invoking the Actavis Inference, e.g., if there is other 
contemporaneous evidence indicating that the purpose and effect of a 
reverse payment was to delay entry. Actavis does not establish a safe 
harbor for patent settlements involving reverse payments that are less 
than litigation costs. 
III.  REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS IN THE DISTRICT COURTS SINCE 
ACTAVIS 
District courts have begun to address several distinct fact patterns 
that have arisen in cases where reverse payments have been challenged 
on antitrust grounds. In this Part, we address several of these fact 
patterns. We continue to believe that the economic logic underlying the 
Supreme Court’s Actavis decision, which forms the basis for the Actavis 
Inference, is robust and flexible and can be applied in practice without 
undue difficulty in a wide range of cases.  
A.  Cash vs. Noncash Payments 
While the Court referred repeatedly in the Actavis decision to a 
“cash” payment from the patent holder to the alleged infringer, the 
economic logic articulated by the Court applies regardless of the 
payment’s form. Restricting the Actavis Inference to payments made in 
“cash” would open up a gaping loophole: the patent holder could purchase 
corporate shares in General Motors, transfer the shares to the generic, 
and evade Actavis because no cash changed hands. Furthermore, if forms 
of payment that are less liquid or more difficult to value are exempt from 
the Actavis Inference, settling firms will have an incentive to use those 
forms of payment rather than cash, creating additional inefficiencies, 
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We were therefore quite surprised when two district courts ruled 
recently that the Actavis Inference only applies to “cash” payments.22 In 
the Lamictal case, the court stated that “the Supreme Court considered a 
reverse payment to involve an exchange of money.”23 The court then 
rejected the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “payment” as “the 
delivery of money or some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full 
discharge of an obligation.”24 The court even acknowledged that Chief 
Justice Roberts’ dissent in Actavis repeatedly observed that the 
majority’s logic must sweep in “other consideration” and “alternative 
arrangements.”25 We expect that the appellate courts will reject such a 
cramped interpretation of payment.26 
At this writing, seven other district courts have explicitly addressed 
this same issue, considering settlements on six drugs; these courts have 
been more faithful to the logic in Actavis, finding that the form of the 
reverse payment does not matter for the purposes of the Actavis 
Inference.27 We urge other courts to follow this route. 
As a practical matter, when the transfer of value from the patent 
holder to the alleged infringer takes a form other than cash, some 
                                                                                                                             
22. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 1:13-MD-2472, 2014 WL 4368924, at *12 
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) (concluding that payment must be in cash based on the “literal holding 
of Actavis,” while noting the resulting “quandary” that under this interpretation, settling 
parties “are likely to evade Sherman Act scrutiny”); In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser 
Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 565 (D.N.J. 2014) (reading Actavis to require that the 
settlement “must include money”). 
23. Lamictal, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 568. 
24. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (9th ed. 2010)). 
25. Id. (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). The court then 
found the contrary reasoning in other courts’ conclusions, as discussed below, to be 
“unpersuasive.” Id. at 569. 
26. At this writing, Lamictal has been argued and is pending before the Third Circuit, 
and Loestrin is awaiting briefing in the First Circuit. 
27. These district courts have analyzed settlements involving Aggrenox, Effexor XR, 
Lipitor, Niaspan, Nexium (two courts), and Lidoderm. In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 
14-MD-2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634, at *40–41 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015); In re 
Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *20 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) 
(concluding that payments are not limited to cash, but that plaintiffs must provide a 
reliable basis for assertions of non-cash payment); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-
2389, 2013 WL 4780496, at *26 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (“[N]othing in Actavis strictly requires 
that the payment be in the form of money . . . .”); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-
2460, 2014 WL 4403848, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014) (“[T]he term ‘reverse payment’ is 
not limited to a cash payment.”); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 
2d 367, 392 (D. Mass. 2013) (“Nowhere in Actavis did the Supreme Court explicitly require 
some sort of monetary transaction . . . .”); Time Ins. Co. v. Astrazeneca AB, No. 14-4149, 
2014 WL 4933025, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2014) (Nexium) (“[R]everse payments deemed 
anti-competitive pursuant to Actavis may take forms other than cash payments.”); United 
Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., No. 14-MD-02521, 
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additional analysis will be required to quantify the dollar value of the 
reverse payment. This analysis is likely to depend heavily on the specific 
facts of the case at hand and may well require a benchmarking exercise 
that compares the case at hand to experience in similar markets. 
Importantly, this analysis should be conducted from the perspective of 
the patent holder. This follows from the economic logic underlying the 
Actavis Inference: if the settlement involves the patent holder’s sacrifice 
of something with greater value to it than its own prospective litigation 
costs, it is reasonable to presume that the patent holder is paying for 
some protection from competition.28 
Therefore, for noncash reverse payments, the courts should seek to 
measure the dollar value sacrificed by the patent holder as a result of the 
agreement it reached with the alleged infringer.29 A pharmaceutical 
example illustrates in general terms how this exercise is likely to play 
out in court. Suppose the settlement involves Brand granting a license to 
Generic to produce and market a second drug. Suppose further that 
Brand will earn $100 million in royalties and Generic will make $25 
million in economic profits under that license. Importantly, suppose there 
is evidence from other licenses in the industry or from internal company 
documents that if instead of licensing to Generic, Brand had made an 
arms-length, stand-alone license for the second drug, Brand would expect 
to earn $150 million in royalties while giving the licensee zero economic 
profits.30 With this fact pattern, the settlement involves a $50 million 
profit sacrifice by Brand,31 which is greater than the $25 million value of 
the license to Generic.32 
                                                                                                                             
28. As we have noted in previous work, although a sacrifice by the patent holder is 
the primary focus of the present analysis, a sacrifice is not the only route to establishing an 
anticompetitive effect. See Activating Actavis, supra note 7, at n.22. 
29. The same principle applies for reverse payments made in cash. For cash 
payments, the profit sacrificed by the patent holder is simply the amount of the reverse 
payment.  
30. Economic profits are defined as profits in excess of a normal, risk-adjusted return 
on capital. If several equally capable licensees compete vigorously to sign the license with 
Brand for the second drug, their economic profits will be driven toward zero. 
31. The $50 million profit sacrifice results from Brand earning $100 million rather 
than $150 million in royalties.  
32. In this example, the value of the license to Generic, $25 million, is less than the 
profit sacrifice by Brand, which is $50 million. The example is purposefully designed so that 
the combined profits of $125 million under Brand’s license with Generic are less than the 
combined profits of $150 million earned under the arms-length, stand-alone license. This 
“value destruction” will occur if (for example) Generic is not the best-qualified licensee for 
the second drug. Here, using the less-capable Generic as the licensee for the second drug 
results in a $25 million destruction in combined value, $125 million rather than $150 
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B.   Promises Not to Offer an Authorized Generic Drug 
A number of reverse payment settlements have involved promises on 
the part of the branded pharmaceutical firm not to offer an authorized 
generic (“AG”) version of the same drug. We now describe AGs and 
explain how these agreements should be analyzed under the Actavis 
decision. 
1.  Authorized Generic Drugs 
An AG is a generic version of a drug, authorized by a branded drug 
maker under its own FDA approval. The branded firm may market the 
drug itself or, more commonly, contract with a generic drug maker to do 
so. AGs have been an important feature of generic product launches since 
the 2000s.33 Courts have consistently held that an AG may be marketed 
even during the 180-day exclusivity period of an independent generic 
drug maker provided for in certain circumstances under the Hatch-
Waxman Act.34 
There are several reasons why the supplier of the branded drug may 
choose to introduce or enable an AG version. The AG will typically be 
priced lower than the branded drug, which can enable the supplier of the 
branded drug to engage in price discrimination. Such price 
discrimination increases profits and might also increase output and 
benefit consumers. This strategy is hardly unique to pharmaceuticals. 
Firms commonly offer multiple products targeted at different market 
segments, and they often use different brand names for high-end 
products than for low-end products.  
One should bear in mind that the branded product and the AG are 
not independent rivals, even if they superficially appear to compete. In 
cases where the firm selling the branded product introduces its own AG, 
this is clear enough. But even in cases where the branded firm contracts 
with a generic drug maker to market the AG product, that firm is not 
truly an independent rival. Rather, it is dependent on the branded firm, 
                                                                                                                             
cash forms of payment in reverse-payment patent settlements in an attempt to avoid 
antitrust liability. 
33. FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM 
IMPACT 26–27 & fig.2–7 (2011) (analyzing generic launches with 180-day exclusivity for 
branded drug administered as capsule or tablet, and finding that for fifty-five launches 
between 2003 and 2008, 33, or 61 percent, included an AG). 
34. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 271 (4th Cir. 2006); Teva Pharm. Indus. 
v. FDA, 410 F.3d 51, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex, Inc., 659 F.3d 
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which sets the quantity and pricing terms of the marketing arrangement 
and may share in the profits. 
Despite these qualifications, the presence of an authorized generic 
version injects some additional competition into the market, above and 
beyond that offered by the branded product and any generic products 
supplied by other firms. From an antitrust perspective, this additional 
competition can be especially significant if there would otherwise be only 
one independent generic supplier.  
2.  No-Authorized-Generic Provisions 
A promise by the branded pharmaceutical firm not to introduce or 
permit an AG is generally referred to as a “no-AG” provision. A no-AG 
provision is clearly costly to the branded pharmaceutical firm, since it 
constrains that firm’s future business choices. No-AG provisions also are 
clearly valuable to the independent generic firm. A no-AG provision is 
especially valuable to a generic firm poised to enjoy the 180-day 
exclusivity period. 
As discussed in the previous subpart, two district courts have held 
that Actavis is limited to cash. In both, the alleged noncash compensation 
included a no-AG deal, which these courts therefore rejected as a basis 
for the Actavis Inference.35 Five others have recognized that no-AG deals 
are a form of payment.36 Yet another district court, while acknowledging 
the above referenced evidence about output and price effects of 
authorized generic entry in theory, nevertheless concluded that the value 
of a branded firm’s promise not to enter the market was so “vague and 
amorphous” that as pleaded, it could not be counted as a payment for 
delay.37 
This reaction is in sharp contrast to the concretely high value placed 
on no-AG provisions by both branded and generic firms. Real-world 
evidence of that value recently emerged in the first reverse payment trial 
                                                                                                                             
35. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2472, 2014 WL 4368924, at *12 
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014); In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-995, 2014 
WL 282755, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). 
36. The drugs are Aggrenox, Lidoderm, Niaspan, and Nexium (two district courts). In 
re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-MD-2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634, at *48–51 (D. 
Conn. Mar. 23, 2015); United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharm. 
USA, Inc., No. 14-MD-02521, 2014 WL 6465235, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014) 
(Lidoderm); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2460, 2014 WL 4403848, at *11 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 5, 2014); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392 
(D. Mass. 2013); Time Ins. Co. v. Astrazeneca AB, No. 14-4149, 2014 WL 4933025, at *3–4 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2014) (Nexium) (agreeing with In re Nexium). 
37. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *21 
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after Actavis. At trial, purchasers and end-payors for Nexium, a 
blockbuster heartburn drug, argued that AstraZeneca paid first-filer 
Ranbaxy to delay entry by agreeing to a no-AG provision. In particular, 
plaintiffs offered a short memorandum prepared by outside counsel 
describing Ranbaxy’s anticipated bargaining position and AstraZeneca’s 
strategy in response.38 The strategy centered on offering a no-AG 
provision. As counsel candidly explained, “Ranbaxy likely will want a 
settlement that preserves its 180-day period of exclusivity against other 
generics and also guarantees that exclusivity against authorized generic 
competition, and it may be willing to agree to a relatively late entry date 
in a settlement that provides it with sole exclusivity.”39 
In any case where the plaintiff asserts that a no-AG provision 
constitutes all or part of a large and unexplained reverse payment, the 
plaintiff will need to present evidence allowing the court to reasonably 
approximate how much money the branded firm sacrificed by agreeing 
not to introduce or enable an AG version. Evidence regarding the profits 
the branded firm expected to earn from an AG will be especially relevant 
for this inquiry. Only rarely will it be possible to compute the value of a 
no-AG provision with great precision, as one would with a strictly cash 
payment. But it should often be possible to approximate that value under 
reasonable economic assumptions. As a result, we believe that a no-AG 
provision is a form of reverse payment whose value can be estimated and 
made fully subject to the Actavis Inference. 
More problematically, a no-AG provision places a second naked 
market division agreement on top of the first agreement to delay generic 
entry in exchange for a large payment. Nevertheless, courts thus far have 
taken the view, albeit with little analysis, that no-AG agreements must 
be assessed together with the rest of the deal under the rule of reason, 
rather than viewing them as independently unlawful per se.40 It bears 
repeating that pay-for-delay settlements are not mere licenses over the 
term of the delay, but horizontal agreements not to compete, and no-AG 
provisions make a bad situation worse. In fact, the no-AG provision is 
more harmful to competition than a cash settlement of the same 
magnitude. The cash settlement operates as a mere wealth transfer from 
the brand to the generic, delaying entry but with little impact on generic 
                                                                                                                             
38. Timothy Hester, Nexium Settlement Considerations (Aug. 3, 2007). The memo 
was introduced at trial as Exhibit 140, and attached as Exhibit D to Motion for Permanent 
Injunction, In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, No. 12-MD-2409 (D. Mass. 
Jan. 7, 2015) (No. 1457). 
39. Id. 
40. This is the case, explicitly or implicitly, with the district court opinions 
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output once generic entry takes place. By contrast, the no-AG provision 
compensates the independent generic in a more sinister fashion, by 
giving it protection from competition that would otherwise occur and thus 
keeping up prices at consumers’ expense. Worse yet, a legal rule that 
permitted no-AG provisions while condemning large cash payments 
would induce firms to choose the more harmful former alternative. 
Nor can a no-AG provision be defended on the grounds that it is 
nothing more than an exclusive license, which patent holders generally 
have the statutory right to grant.41 That statutory argument might apply 
if Brand’s no-AG commitment were combined with a patent license that 
allowed Generic to enter the market immediately, but at the time the no-
AG provision is negotiated there is no marketing under a license at all, 
but at most a promise to license at some time in the future. Clearly, the 
Actavis Court did not believe that a pay-for-delay settlement was a 
“license” authorized by the Patent Act, for it gave as one of its rationales 
that this type of settlement was nowhere authorized by the patent 
statute.42 Moreover, focusing on the legality of an exclusive license misses 
the key issue, the fact of a transfer of value from Brand to Generic. As 
one district court explained this point, “[i]f some particular transfer of 
money would be unlawful—for whatever reason—its unlawfulness is not 
cured merely because the value is transferred in the form of exclusive 
licenses instead of cash, irrespective of whether the grant of an exclusive 
license would otherwise be valid.”43 
Summarizing, no-AG provisions are even more worrisome from an 
antitrust perspective than are reverse payments made in cash. No-AG 
provisions should be treated as a form of reverse payment, the magnitude 
of which must be estimated on a case-by-case basis. The Actavis 
Inference that a large and unexplained reverse payment is 
anticompetitive should apply to sufficiently valuable no-AG provisions. 
C.  Pleading Issues 
Pleading standards for pay-for-delay cases must meet the procedural 
standards of the Supreme Court’s Twombly decision,44 which assesses 
                                                                                                                             
41. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (patentee may grant an exclusive license). 
42. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013). 
43. In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-MD-2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634, at 
*49 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015); see also id. (“The statutory authority to grant exclusive 
licenses no more immunizes reverse-payment settlements that include them from antitrust 
scrutiny under Actavis than the statutory authority to use cash as legal tender immunizes 
reverse-payment settlements made in cash from such scrutiny.”). 
44. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558, 570 (2007) (concluding that 
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specificity requirements, and also the substantive standards of Actavis, 
which require a “large” and “unexplained” payment in exchange for a 
delay in entry. Here, we consider standards that plaintiffs must meet if 
they intend to avail themselves of the Actavis Inference; we do not 
address what applicable standards should be if the plaintiffs have 
another plan to establish an anticompetitive payment for delay.  
1.  Products and Services Furnished by the Branded Firm  
Often, the pleading issue arises in the context of noncash payments. 
As discussed above, most courts agree that the payment need not be in 
cash.45 They are also sensitive to the fact that noncash payments are 
more difficult to evaluate than cash. This complication has presented 
several issues at the pleading stage. 
If the noncash payment consists of products or services, then the 
associated cost to the branded firm (including the opportunity cost) must 
be alleged and eventually proven. In one case involving the drug 
Lidoderm, one component of value was easily alleged because the 
agreement required the brand to give $12 million per month of the 
branded product to the generic, thus stipulating the value of the noncash 
payment.46 In any event, the court concluded, a noncash payment that 
takes the form of product involves “a simple transfer of a fungible 
product” and “calculating its value is straightforward.”47 As a result, a 
plaintiff who simply alleged the value of such a transfer survived 
dismissal on this issue.48 
2.  Settlement of Unrelated Patent Litigation  
In other cases the payment may be more difficult to value. For 
example, if the payment takes the form of a settlement payment in 
unrelated patent litigation that is far off of its reasonable market value, 
then a plaintiff would have to place a value on that litigation in order to 
                                                                                                                             
speculative level,” which requires more than a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
45. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
46. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 
14-MD-02521, 2014 WL 6465235, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014). 
47. Id. 
48. See also King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-CV-1797, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *63–69 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015) (denying summary judgment, in case 
involving alleged services provided by the generic, after crediting opinion of plaintiffs’ 
experts that the services were “unnecessary and unwanted”; not necessary for plaintiff to 
show that the services were mispriced, provided that they created a reasonable inference 
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plausibly allege that there was a payment for delay.49 Importantly, 
however, nothing in the standards for motions to dismiss prevent the 
ordinary tools of statistical and economic analysis from being used to 
estimate the value of the settlement of the litigation. This may require 
inferences to be drawn from experiences in similar (benchmark) markets, 
projections of market share or margins, and the like. Certainly, the 
motion to dismiss standard should not require more than ordinary 
summary judgment and trial rules require of expert testimony generally, 
and may make use of the same tools.50 
3.  No-Authorized-Generic Deals  
As discussed above, most courts have recognized that no-AG 
provisions can constitute a payment for delay.51 Placing a value on no-AG 
agreements is more difficult than simply assessing a product price. To 
employ the Actavis Inference in the context of no-AG agreements, 
evaluation requires an estimate of the difference between branded profits 
with and without authorized generic entry. As noted previously, however, 
the parties negotiating these agreements appear to have little difficulty 
placing a value on them.52 The district court in the Lidoderm case found 
it sufficient when a complaint cited an FTC study comparing market 
shares and margins in response to independent generic entry where an 
authorized generic was and was not present. The court concluded that 
“[t]hese calculations are not overly complicated, and they are plausible.”53 
4.  Size of Payment Compared with Avoided Litigation Costs  
A further pleading issue, beyond the valuation of noncash payments, 
arises in the context of avoided litigation costs. Although a few courts 
have suggested the contrary, the Supreme Court does not require 
evidence of a payment of a particular size. Actavis requires only a 
payment in excess of the patentee’s reasonably anticipated avoided 
                                                                                                                             
49. Courts have confronted this issue in In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 
No. 12-MD-02409, 2014 WL 4370333 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2014) (summary judgment); and In 
re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-2389, 2013 WL 4780496, at *26 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) 
(motion to dismiss). 
50. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 397 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
51. See supra Part III.B. 
52. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
53. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 
No. 14-MD-02521, 2014 WL 6465235, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014) (citing and discussing 
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litigation costs to trigger the Actavis Inference. The Actavis dissent 
recited two estimates for litigation costs, ranging from $1.5 million per 
side to $10 million per suit,54 which provide useful guidance. So a 
plaintiff need not plead the precise or even a ballpark value of a no-AG or 
other noncash agreement; rather, it must provide a sufficient basis for 
believing that the cost to the branded firm exceeds that firm’s anticipated 
litigation costs. A figure of $200 million would be sufficient, but so would 
$20 million. We thus question one district court’s conclusion in Effexor 
XR that “the non-monetary payment must be converted to a reliable 
estimate of its monetary value so that it may be analyzed against the 
Actavis factors.”55 Actavis never states that the value of the payment 
must be ascertained, but only that it must be shown to be above 
reasonably anticipated litigation costs to trigger the Actavis Inference. At 
the same time, the Effexor XR court was disturbed by the fact that the 
plaintiffs did not provide a basis for placing any value at all on the 
arrangement. However, the court also suggested that simply citing the 
Actavis dissent’s figures would have been sufficient.56 
One important takeaway from these decisions is that those drafting 
complaints should avail themselves of the enormous published literature 
from the FTC and elsewhere placing a value on such things as litigation 
costs, no-AG agreements, and other arrangements. While summary 
judgment may require more particularized proof specific to the case, 
citation of relevant, credible studies should be sufficient to satisfy the 
Twombly pleading threshold. 
D.  Causation and Damages 
Unlike the government enforcement agencies, private plaintiffs must 
plead injury and indicate some reasonable basis for damages if they are 
seeking them. For the plaintiff seeking an injunction, an allegation of 
                                                                                                                             
54. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2243–44 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
55. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *20 
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014). The same district judge reached a similar conclusion in the Lipitor 
litigation. In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-2389, 2013 WL 4780496, at *27 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 5, 2013) (dismissing complaint for failure to estimate of value of settlements of 
unrelated litigation alleged to be a payment for delay). For a contrary conclusion, see In re 
Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-MD-2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634, at *47–48 (D. 
Conn. Mar. 23, 2015) (“shar[ing] the concerns expressed” in Effexor XR and Lipitor, but 
denying dismissal because “it is also clear that very precise and particularized estimates of 
fair value and anticipated litigation costs may require evidence in the exclusive possession 
of the defendants, as well as expert analysis, and that these issues are sufficiently factual to 
require discovery.”). 
56. In re Effexor, 2014 WL 4988410, at *22 (“[T]he Complaint could have alleged that 
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threatened harm is sufficient and should be satisfied by reasonable 
allegations that the settlement agreement is unlawful and that entry was 
delayed past the reasonably anticipated entry date. Indeed, to the extent 
that the injunction seeks only prospective relief, a precise but-for entry 
date need not be calculated at all. Once the settlement is found unlawful 
the court may simply dissolve the agreement and open the way to 
immediate entry. 
 If the plaintiff is seeking damages, however, calculating value is 
likely to require establishing a but-for entry date, or estimate of the date 
on which generic entry would have occurred had the pay-for-delay 
settlement not intervened. In some cases the but-for entry date could be 
almost immediately after the settlement. For example, the Lidoderm 
district judge credited the argument (on a motion to dismiss) that the 
generic would have been willing to risk entry immediately once it had 
received a favorable ruling on claim construction of the patent in 
question.57 In any event, estimating a but-for entry date is likely to be 
easiest in cases where a court has already declared a patent invalid or 
legal proceedings in a patent infringement suit have moved sufficiently 
far along to warrant the conclusion that a reasonable generic would have 
been willing to risk entry. 
Causation issues also can arise if FDA approval has not yet occurred, 
for reasons unrelated to the patent dispute itself. If the first-filing generic 
had difficulties gaining FDA approval, the question naturally arises 
whether the settlement was likely to delay generic entry. However, even 
if the settling first-filing generic could not have entered earlier, due to 
lack of FDA approval, the settlement may still have had an 
anticompetitive effect, if the reverse-payment settlement delayed entry 
by other generic firms. These issues arose in the Nexium case, where the 
jury rejected causation on specific facts.58 
                                                                                                                             
57. United Food, 2014 WL 6465235, at *15–16; see also King Drug Co. of Florence v. 
Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-CV-1797, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *69–71 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 
2015) (plaintiffs created fact issue that generic would have entered at risk but for 
settlement). 
58. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Permanent Injunction, In re 
Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, No. 12-MD-02409 (D. Mass. Jan. 7, 2015); cf. 
In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., Nos. 14-1521, 14-1522, 2015 WL 265548, at *4 (1st Cir. Jan. 
21, 2015) (approving, on divided panel, certification of class action even though expert’s 
methodology for proving causation and harm might have included a few class members who 
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E.  Other Issues 
Also important are collateral allegations that do not pertain directly 
to the pay-for-delay sequence. While the Actavis Inference does not 
require proof of patent invalidity or noninfringement, some cases directly 
involve such claims. For example, some cases contain independent 
allegations that the brand’s patent was obtained by inequitable conduct 
or fraud, and that the improperly brought infringement suit was also 
monopolization or an attempt to monopolize under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.59  
Today it is clear that consumers have standing to bring Walker 
Process actions of this sort.60 Such a claim could yield damages quite 
aside from the existence of any pay-for-delay settlement.61 In addition, 
success on such a claim may provide evidence of a presumptive but-for 
entry date. For example, suppose that a branded firm whose primary 
patent expired in 2010 obtained a secondary patent lasting until 2020 but 
the latter patent was fraudulently obtained and unenforceable. One 
might readily conclude that one or more generic firms would have been 
able to enter in 2010 upon the expiry of the original patent. 
IV.  THE ACTAVIS INFERENCE WITH MULTIPLE GENERIC ENTRANTS 
In the Actavis decision, Justice Breyer opened his opinion by focusing 
on a patent holder and a single alleged infringer: “Company A sues 
                                                                                                                             
59. See In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *26 
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) (finding sufficient allegations of intent to commit fraud on the Patent 
Office to withstand motion to dismiss); FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 527, 534–36 
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (concluding that patentee had committed fraud on the Patent Office prior to 
entering settlement agreement); In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., 11 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1345 
(M.D.L. 2014) (noting assertion of sham litigation claim); King Drug Co. of Florence v. 
Cephalon, Inc., Nos. 06-CV-1797, 06-CV-1833, 06-CV-2768, 08-CV-2141, 2014 WL 982848, 
at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2014) (discussing Walker Process claim accompanying reverse 
payment claim against parties to Provigil settlement); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12-
CV-2389, 2013 WL 4780496, at *18–20 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (noting allegations of Walker 
Process fraud in obtaining patent). 
60. Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 
In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 690–91 (2d Cir. 2009). See 
generally Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) 
(noting that patent infringement lawsuit based on fraudulently obtained patent could 
constitute an antitrust violation). 
61. For example, some decisions permit recovery of (trebled) litigation costs as 
antitrust damages for Walker Process claims. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. 
Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 373–74 (7th Cir. 1987); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. 
Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1977); 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
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Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle under 
terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce 
the patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, 
the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars.”62  
Despite this crisp and abstract framing, which focuses on just two 
firms, the Actavis case itself actually involved more than one generic 
entrant, as Justice Breyer recognized.63 As a matter of law, the Actavis 
Inference established by the Supreme Court clearly applies whether 
there is one generic entrant or multiple generic entrants. 
Many pharmaceutical reverse payment antitrust cases involve the 
prospect of sequential entry by multiple generic suppliers.64 Typically, 
after the first-filing generic firm’s 180-day period of exclusivity ends, 
additional generic firms enter the market before patent expiration. 
Indeed, most of the drugs that are currently the subject of reverse 
payment antitrust litigation have this feature. To illustrate, consider 
seven drugs discussed in Part II.A, analyzed there in the context of 
district court opinions that assessed alleged noncash payments for 
delay.65 For five of the seven, additional generic entrants were waiting in 
the wings following entry by the first filer.66 For the remaining two drugs, 
                                                                                                                             
62. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
63. Solvay, the manufacturer of AndroGel, faced multiple generic firms who had filed 
ANDAs seeking entry before patent expiration. Actavis was first, and therefore enjoyed the 
prospect of 180-day exclusivity. (At that time, the firm was called Watson. Watson later 
acquired Actavis and changed its name to Actavis.) Paddock Laboratories also filed an 
ANDA, and partnered with a third firm, Par Pharmaceuticals, to share the benefits and 
costs of its challenge. As a later filer, Par/Paddock was stuck behind the Actavis exclusivity. 
Id. at 2229. Solvay sued the generic firms, which litigated the dispute for several years. For 
a description, see In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. II, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374–75 (N.D. 
Ga. 2010). During the course of litigation, the FDA approved the Actavis ANDA. Shortly 
thereafter, Solvay entered the challenged settlements with Watson and Par/Paddock, with 
alleged payments exceeding $170 million to Actavis and $72 million to Par/Paddock. See 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (describing payments to Actavis for nine years between $19 and 
$30 million per year, $60 million to Par, and $12 million to Paddock). 
64. Multiple entry can also occur without sequential entry. For example, for some 
drugs, there are multiple first filers that settle for entry on the same day. The case of 
multiple simultaneous entrants is in important respects similar to the monopoly/duopoly 
case. We do not separately model that case here. 
65. The drugs are Effexor XR, Lamictal, Lidoderm, Lipitor, Loestrin, Nexium, and 
Niaspan. As to an eighth drug discussed in Part II.A, Aggrenox, the timing of multiple 
generic entry cannot be assessed using public information. 
66. Effexor XR: First-filer Teva secured a July 2010 entry date; sixteen later filers 
were sued and settled, starting with IMPAX, which secured a June 2011 entry date. See In 
re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *11, *12 & n.13 
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014); Press Release, IMPAX Announces Final Settlement of Generic 
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the first filer’s settlement was set so late in the patent term that 
additional generic entry before patent expiration was infeasible.67  
                                                                                                                             
Lidoderm: First-filer Watson secured a September 2013 entry date. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., No. 14-MD-02521, 2014 WL 
6465235, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014). At least three additional generics—Mylan, Noven, 
and TWI—filed Paragraph IV certifications and were sued. Mylan’s ANDA (#20–2346) 
predated the Watson settlement. Mylan secured a consent judgment of noninfringement on 
claim 1 of the single patent at suit. Consent Decree & Order, Endo Pharm. v. Mylan 
Technologies, Inc., No. 11-CV-220 (D. Del. Oct. 4, 2013). As of December 2014, no additional 
generic entrants have been approved due to unrelated FDA approval delays. See Mylan Q3 
2014 Analyst Call (Oct. 30, 2014). 
Lipitor: First-filer Ranbaxy secured a November 2011 entry date. Later filer Teva was 
waiting in the wings to enter, but for Ranbaxy’s 180-day eligibility. See New York Attorney 
General, Assurance of Discontinuance 7 (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AOD_Teva_Ranbaxy_Signed.pdf. 
Nexium: First-filer Ranbaxy secured a May 2014 entry date. Later filer Teva secured 
the same date in a second settlement. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. 
Supp. 2d 367, 382–83 (D. Mass. 2013). The Teva date was, in practice, subject to a 180-delay 
thanks to Ranbaxy’s exclusivity. 
Niaspan: First-filer Barr (later acquired by Teva) secured a September 2013 entry date 
and launched at that point. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litigation, No. 13-MD-2460, 2014 WL 
4403848, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014). Suits against Lupin and Sun, among others, were 
filed and later dismissed. Lupin and Sun received approval in early 2014, shortly after 
expiration of the 180 days. 
Androgel, the drug considered in Actavis, is a further example. At the time of the 
Androgel settlements, Actavis and Par/Paddock had agreed to staggered entry dates. See 
Solvay Settles Dispute with Par, Watson, Associated Press, Sept. 13, 2006 (noting August 
2015 entry for Actavis, February 2016 entry for Par/Paddock); Brief in Opposition of 
Par/Paddock at App. 4a ¶ 6, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 [hereinafter Brief in Opposition] 
(providing in settlement agreement for entry in February 2016 provided that Actavis 
entered with exclusivity in August 2015). Later, Actavis voluntarily relinquished its 
entitlement to the 180 days. Brief in Opposition at 10; see also In re Androgel Antitrust 
Litig. II, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1377. As a consequence, Actavis and Par/Paddock ended up 
with the same entry date. See Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other 
Equitable Relief ¶ 65, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 09-CV-00955 (N.D. Ga. May 28, 
2009) (alleging August 2015 entry date for both Actavis and Par/Paddock); Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2229 (“The other generic manufacturers made roughly similar promises.”). 
67. For Lamictal and Loestrin, the first filer’s entry date was six months prior to 
patent expiration, and the first filer anticipated launching with exclusivity, leaving other 
generics with the prospect of waiting until patent expiration.  
Lamictal: First-filer Teva secured a July 2008 entry date, six months prior to patent 
expiration (as extended by pediatric exclusivity). In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust 
Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 561 (D.N.J. 2014); see also Letter from Gary Buehler, Dir. of 
Office of Generic Drugs, FDA, to Philip Erickson, Teva Pharms. USA (Aug. 30, 2006) 
(approving ANDA 76-388 with exclusivity). 
Loestrin: First-filer Watson secured a January 2014 entry date, six months prior to 
patent expiration. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2472, 2014 WL 4368924, 
at *4 (D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014). Later filer Lupin was sued and settled for entry “around the 
same time” as patent expiration. Id. at *5. Watson subsequently forfeited its exclusivity for 
failing to receive tentative approval within thirty months. Letter from Robert West, Dep. 
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Because multiple generic entry is so common, as courts apply the 
Actavis Inference, it is important to understand how the economic logic 
underpinning the Actavis Inference works in cases with more than one 
generic entrant. 
In Activating Actavis, we developed and explained the economic logic 
behind the Actavis Inference by describing the incentive of a patent 
holder to pay a single potential entrant to delay its entry into the market. 
Our economic model analyzed the case in which entry would convert a 
monopoly into a duopoly, i.e., the case of a single generic entrant. Here 
we extend our economic model to include multiple generic entrants. 
Reflecting the 180-day exclusivity period rewarded to the first generic 
firm under the Hatch-Waxman Act, our model contemplates sequential 
entry: initially one generic firm enters, followed later by more. 
Common sense and intuition suggest that the Actavis Inference is 
even more important with multiple generic entrants than with just one 
generic entrant. With multiple generic entrants, delaying generic entry 
will boost profits even more, and harm competition even more, than with 
just one generic entrant. As a result, pay-for-delay settlements are even 
more tempting for the settling parties and even more harmful to 
consumers.  
 We show here that common sense and intuition are firmly supported 
by cold economic logic and formal economic modeling. Along the way, we 
show that the challenge to the Actavis Inference made by Kobayashi, 
Wright, Ginsburg, and Tsai in their recent paper is flawed on multiple 
grounds. KWGT criticize the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis as well 
as challenging the economic basis for the Actavis Inference that the 
Court established. Much of what KWGT recommend is of no help to 
courts, since KWGT elaborate arguments made by the Actavis dissent but 
rejected by the Court. Other claims by KWGT are incorrect or contradict 
KWGT’s own economic analysis. 
A.  Sequential Generic Entry Under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
The Hatch-Waxman Act’s provision of 180-day exclusivity to a first-
filing generic firm creates an important mechanism for staggered entry 
by multiple generics.68 In many instances, additional generics are blocked 
                                                                                                                             
2009) (approving ANDA 78-267). According to plaintiffs, its settlement guaranteed the 180 
days by contract (to the extent within control of the parties). Direct Purchaser Consolidated 
Amended Complaint at 41–42, Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 13-2472 (D.R.I. Dec. 6, 
2013). 
68. In this paper, we assume basic familiarity with this and other features of the 
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from the market until 180 days after the first generic’s entry.69 Due to 
this provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act, a settlement between a branded 
pharmaceutical firm and the first-filing generic firm effectively 
immunizes even a very weak patent from challenge for the period covered 
by the delayed entry agreement plus 180 days. 
Settlement has a further consequence in the case of multiple 
entrants. A fully litigated declaration of patent invalidity would estop the 
branded firm from asserting its patent against other generics, so after 
180 days other generics would be able to enter the market as well.70 This 
prospect of entry by a second (or third) generic makes it even more 
valuable to the branded firm to enter into a pay-for-delay settlement with 
the first-filing generic, because drug prices, and hence the branded firm’s 
profits, fall further in response to subsequent generic entry than they do 
in response to the first generic entrant.71  
B.  Economic Analysis with Subsequent Generic Entrants 
In Appendix A, we present two formal economic models in which 
Brand and Generic negotiate to settle their patent litigation. These 
models extend our earlier monopoly-duopoly model to include subsequent 
generic entry.  
In both models, if the parties do not settle, then following litigation, 
we assume that if the Generic prevails in the patent litigation, additional 
generic firms enter the market 180 days after Generic enters.72 The 
models differ in the case of settlement. A settlement specifies the date at 
which Generic can enter the market and the size of a payment from 
                                                                                                                             
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. For a more thorough discussion of the operation of the 
180-day exclusivity period, see C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006).  
69. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). The Supreme Court described the process 
in Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228.  
70. See Blonder-Tongue v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330–34 (1971) (holding 
that a patentee whose patent is found invalid in fully and fairly litigated decision is 
collaterally estopped from claiming validity against a subsequent infringement defendant). 
71. See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug 
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 953–54 (2011) (collecting 
evidence); FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS 
BILLIONS 8 (2010) (concluding that based on public information about drug launches that in 
a “mature” generic market, one year after the first generic enters, generic penetration is 90 
percent and generic prices are 15 percent of the pre-entry branded price). In our model in 
Appendix A, this effect is captured by the term. Our model also reveals an additional benefit 
to the branded firm from settlement that is not present in the model with only a single 
generic entrant. This additional incentive, captured by the term, is independent of the 
agreed-upon entry date of the generic firm. 
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Brand to Generic. In the first model, which we call our “180-day duopoly” 
model, in the case of a settlement, we assume that additional generic 
firms enter the market 180 days after Generic enters the market, even if 
this time occurs before patent expiration. In our second model, the 
“durable duopoly” model, there is no multiple entry until patent 
expiration—that is, the settlement might result in a durable duopoly. 
(Durable duopoly is the case studied by KWGT.) 
We prove four main results, which hold in both models of multiple 
generics. 
Proposition #1 says that the combined incentive of Brand and Generic 
to settle to restrict competition is greater with multiple generic entrants 
than for a single generic entrant. Put differently, the additional combined 
profits (compared with litigation) from the settlement that maximizes 
profits without any antitrust limits are greater in the presence of 
multiple generic entrants.  
Proposition #2 says that if the settlement involves a payment greater 
than Brand’s prospective litigation costs, the settlement reduces the 
period of time during which consumers benefit from competition 
involving multiple generic firms.73  
Proposition #3 says that relaxing the Actavis Inference by allowing 
payments greater than litigation costs would harm consumers and reduce 
total welfare.  
These three propositions together provide strong economic support 
for the Actavis Inference in the presence of multiple generic entrants. 
Proposition #1 warns us that antitrust limits are needed—even more 
with multiple generic entrants—to protect consumers from settlements 
that would otherwise prevent generic entry for some or all of the 
remaining lifetime of the patent.  
Proposition #2 implies that antitrust appropriately comes into play if 
the payment is greater than litigation costs. Such settlements restrict 
competition by shortening the period of multiple generic competition 
compared to litigation. Such settlements are therefore anticompetitive 
under the logic of the Actavis opinion, as they prevent competition or 
eliminate the risk of competition.  
Settlements violate Sherman Act §1 if they restrict competition and 
injure consumers. Given restriction of competition is found in Proposition 
#2, the remaining question is what the benchmark of comparison is for 
consumer welfare by which to judge injury to consumers. Under the 
                                                                                                                             
73. This reduction is relative to the expected period of multiple-generic competition 
under litigation. Such a payment also signals that the patent holder had doubts about 
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Actavis opinion consumers are injured if the settlement leads to lower 
welfare than under either of the following two benchmarks:74 
Benchmark #1. The welfare that consumers could expect from 
completing the litigation. 
Benchmark #2. The welfare that consumers could achieve in an 
alternative settlement that did not have a large payment, i.e., a 
payment exceeding the plaintiff’s prospective litigation cost.75 
The second benchmark is an application of the less restrictive 
alternatives test.76 Lower payments will come with earlier entry dates (in 
equilibrium) and are less restrictive of competition. 
Proposition #3 tells us that a less stringent rule than the Actavis 
Inference, such as an inference only triggered by even larger payments, 
would be worse for consumers. Furthermore, relaxing the Actavis 
Inference is a bad idea even if one uses the more forgiving total welfare 
standard rather than the consumer welfare standard embraced by the 
Supreme Court. 
A corollary of Proposition #3 is that if we observe the parties 
bargaining to a settlement involving a reverse payment in excess of 
prospective litigation costs, then this settlement has lower consumer and 
total welfare than any alternative settlement that they would actually 
reach if they were constrained to a payment equal to or less than these 
litigation costs. Thus any settlement with a large payment injures 
consumers using Benchmark #2 and it therefore violates the antitrust 
laws. 
Injuring consumers compared with Benchmark #1 is not required to 
violate the antitrust laws, given that consumers are injured with respect 
to a reasonable alternative settlement under Benchmark #2. Nonetheless 
it is still worth investigating if settlements with large payments will 
                                                                                                                             
74. See Actavis and Error Costs, supra note 8, at 4. The Court’s opinion supports this 
approach. See id. 
75. The alternative settlement used in Benchmark #2 should be one that the parties 
would likely reach if the parties were constrained to lower reverse payments.  
76. On the importance of less restrictive alternatives in antitrust litigation under the 
rule of reason, see 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1505 
(3d ed. 2010); C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust and 
Constitutional Law (working paper 2015); see also King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, 
Inc., No. 06-CV-1797, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *44, *53–54, *62 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 
2015) (identifying and applying the rule, drawn from standard rule of reason principles, 
that plaintiff has opportunity to demonstrate that defendants’ conduct was not necessary to 
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injure consumers relative to Benchmark #1. We believe that they 
typically will, but we have been able to construct a theoretical 
counterexample in which consumers are better off than with Benchmark 
#1. Our counterexample requires some rather extreme assumptions: (1) 
Brand has no bargaining power; (2) Brand gets nearly the entire market 
during the duopoly period; and (3) There is no increase in quantity 
between duopoly and free entry.  
Our final proposition asserts that typically a settlement with a large 
reverse payment will also injure consumers compared with Benchmark 
#1. More specifically: Propositions #4a and #4b say that settlements with 
payments larger than litigation costs reduce consumer welfare, relative 
to litigation, under the conditions that apply in practice.77  
The basic intuition underlying our four propositions is the same as in 
the monopoly-duopoly model. A payment larger than litigation costs 
raises the question: why is the brand paying so much? In the monopoly-
duopoly model, the answer is that Brand is paying to avoid or eliminate 
duopoly competition. In the multiple generic model, the answer is that 
Brand is paying to avoid or eliminate competition from multiple generics.  
Our analysis further reveals the danger that certain anticompetitive 
reverse payment settlements will not be caught using the Actavis 
Inference. This danger is not unique to the case of multiple generic 
entrants but occurs because the Actavis Inference, by construction, is 
favorable to antitrust defendants. The reason has to do with the 
bargaining dynamics of a branded drug maker. 
The point is most easily seen in the basic monopoly-duopoly model. If 
Generic has all the bargaining power—that is, it retains all of the joint 
gains from settlement—and Brand has none, then a payment that equals 
litigation cost involves no payment for delay. Because Brand has no 
bargaining power, the most Brand can get from the settlement is what it 
could expect from litigation, so the agreed entry date under the 
settlement equals the expected entry date under litigation. Because 
Brand has the option to litigate, this is also the least that Brand will 
accept. Thus, if there are ten years left on the patent and Brand has a 
90% chance of winning the lawsuit, it will pay an amount equal to its 
litigation cost and allow entry at nine years, which equals 90% of ten 
years. There is no payment for delay in such a settlement. If the 
settlement involved a payment from Brand to Generic greater than 
litigation cost, Brand would require some delay in competition beyond the 
nine years. Hence, payments in excess of litigation cost involve payment 
for delay.  
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Suppose instead that Brand has significant bargaining power, as is 
likely in practice. In such a case, even a payment just equal to litigation 
cost would involve a payment for delay. The reason is that while the 
earliest entry date acceptable to Brand is nine years, given a payment 
equal to Brand’s litigation cost, the latest entry date acceptable to 
Generic will be something more than nine years—slightly more than 9.2 
years in an example discussed by KWGT.78 This difference in acceptable 
entry dates represents a bargaining range. If Brand and Generic split the 
difference, a version of equal bargaining power, they will agree to an 
entry date in between—slightly more than 9.1 years. This implies that 
even though the payment just equals Brand’s prospective litigation cost, 
part of the payment is compensation for a delay of 0.1 years. It follows 
that payments somewhat less than litigation cost also involve some 
payment for delay.79 
This example illustrates that the Actavis Inference is not sufficiently 
aggressive to eliminate all anticompetitive settlements. In this context, 
the Inference essentially assumes that Brand has no bargaining power. 
This supports our view that antitrust plaintiffs should and do have the 
ability to challenge reverse payment patent settlements without relying 
on the Inference.  
This analysis does not mean that the Actavis Inference is ineffective. 
What the Inference accomplishes is to identify and deter the worst 
anticompetitive settlements. It prevents Brand and Generic from 
choosing settlements with later entry dates and larger payments—from 
moving out along the “Ray of Delay,” in the terminology of our earlier 
paper80—thereby injuring consumers by reducing competition. 
In the context of multiple generic entry, the effects are more complex 
because multiple entry broadens the bargaining range, compared to the 
monopoly-duopoly model. (KWGT also observe an expansion of the 
bargaining range.81) We speak of a settlement being “minimally 
acceptable” to Brand (respectively Generic) if it yields Brand (Generic) 
profits at least as high as expected under litigation. For any given level of 
payment, the possibility of multiple entry means that Brand would find 
earlier entry minimally acceptable, compared to the monopoly-duopoly 
model. Generic would likewise find later entry minimally acceptable. 
                                                                                                                             
78. See KWGT, supra note 10, at 91 fig.2. 
79. See also Hemphill, supra note 68, at 1594–95 (identifying an allocative harm from 
settlement, where payment is less than Brand’s avoided litigation cost, if Brand has 
significant bargaining power). 
80. Actavis and Error Costs, supra note 8, at 6. 
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If Brand has no bargaining power, it is constrained to enter into a 
minimally acceptable settlement. Thus, compared to the monopoly-
duopoly model, it will accept an earlier date for the first generic entrant. 
Even with zero Brand bargaining power, all the results discussed above, 
regarding lost competition, reduced welfare, and the bad consequences of 
a relaxation of the Actavis Inference, fully apply. Indeed, such 
anticompetitive settlements may occur even in the face of the Inference 
with relatively low payments at or below prospective litigation cost. In 
this further respect, the Inference is insufficiently stringent to identify all 
anticompetitive settlements. However, the higher the reverse payments 
the more anticompetitive the settlements will be, holding bargaining 
power and other factors constant.  
If Brand has bargaining power, settlements at any given level of 
payment are worse for consumers than if Brand has no power. The 
results above all still apply when the Brand has bargaining power and in 
some respects are strengthened. With a payment equal to litigation cost, 
a Brand with substantial bargaining power will insist upon a delay 
(compared to litigation) in the entry of all generics, including the firm it 
is settling with. For this reason, when Brand has substantial bargaining 
power, consumer welfare and total welfare will surely become lower in 
settlement than in litigation even when the inequality conditions of 
Propositions #4 and #4a are not satisfied. The anticompetitive potential 
of settlements is exacerbated by the presence of multiple generics when 
Brand has bargaining power, because Generic’s minimally acceptable 
settlement is later than in a duopoly-monopoly model, and Brand’s 
bargaining power pushes Generic closer to its minimally acceptable 
settlement.82 
C.  Critique of Paper by Kobayashi, Wright, Ginsburg, and Tsai  
KWGT state that in Actavis the Court infers “that reverse payments 
greater than anticipated litigation costs are likely to harm competition” 
and that “[t]he single-entrant models provide analytical support for the 
Court’s inference.”83 We agree. Where we part ways is in multiple entrant 
models (incidentally the actual setting of Actavis). In such cases, KWGT 
believe that the legal rule of Actavis—the Actavis Inference—is not well 
supported by economic analysis. Their conclusion contains three claims: 
                                                                                                                             
82. For related arguments, see Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent 
Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 314 (2012); Hemphill, supra note 68, at 1588–94. 
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The analysis in this article, which incorporates a model that allows 
for multiple entrants under Hatch-Waxman, shows such a rule 
will deem some welfare increasing settlements anticompetitive, 
encourage litigants to use other, potentially more inefficient means 
to settle, and increase the costs of dynamic Type I errors.84 
We show below that each of these three claims is either incorrect, 
inconsistent with KWGT’s own model, or irrelevant to a faithful 
implementation of the Court’s opinion in Actavis.85  
KWGT’s own economic analysis confirms that in the absence of 
antitrust limits (or under the Actavis dissenters’ scope of the patent test), 
Brand and Generic will have the mutual incentive to agree to delay 
Generic’s entry into the market until the expiration of the patent, 
denying consumers any chance of enjoying the benefits of generic 
competition until the patent expires. This is exactly the incentive of the 
parties to move out the Ray of Delay that we described in Actavis and 
Error Costs.86 This incentive is illustrated by some early pay-for-delay 
settlements reached before parties became wary of antitrust liability,87 
and also by some more recent settlements.88 Furthermore, KWGT’s own 
economic model supports a more stringent approach to reverse payment 
settlements than provided by the Actavis Inference. As a result, there is a 
striking internal contradiction between the results found in KWGT’s 
economic model and their policy conclusions. 
As a preface for what follows, we note that all of the economic 
examples used by KWGT in their article are special cases of the durable 
duopoly model presented in Appendix A to this article. As a result, the 
three propositions discussed above and proven in Appendix A with 
respect to both of our models, also apply to all of KWGT’s numerical 
examples. We now discuss KWGT’s three claims. 
 
                                                                                                                             
84. Id. at 95. 
85. Our statements below should be understood to be made in the context of the 
KWGT examples and that of the models in our Appendix. As a result, some statements are 
starker than we would necessarily make outside the context of these economic models. 
86. Actavis and Error Costs, supra note 8, at 6. 
87. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 
519–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
88. For example, the Lamictal and Loestrin settlements discussed above feature entry 
only in the last six months of the patent term, leaving just enough space for the first-filing 
generic to exercise exclusivity before patent expiration. For other drugs, the settlement date 
is timed to correspond to the effective end of the drug product’s life due to efforts to switch 
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KWGT Claim #1: The Actavis Inference “will deem some 
welfare increasing settlements anticompetitive.” 
Is Claim #1 a problem for the Actavis Inference? KWGT certainly 
suggest as much, but as we now show, it is not.  
If Claim #1 is referring to consumer welfare,89 the standard used by 
the Actavis Court, then the claim flatly contradicts one of KWGT’s own 
findings. In particular, when KWGT analyze the case of reverse 
payments with multiple generic entrants,90 they conclude: “Therefore, all 
feasible settlements, including those in which there is no reverse 
payment, generate consumer welfare that is lower than the expected 
welfare net of litigation costs that would be produced through 
litigation.”91  
Regardless of whether Claim #1 refers to total welfare or consumer 
welfare, Claim #1 does not undermine the Actavis Inference. What does it 
mean that the Actavis Inference “will deem some welfare increasing 
settlements anticompetitive”? At most, it means that some feasible 
welfare increasing hypothetical settlements are banned by the Actavis 
Inference.92 But, the question is not whether feasible settlements that 
would improve welfare are prevented by the Actavis Inference. The 
question is whether desirable settlements that would actually be chosen 
in equilibrium are prevented by the Actavis Inference. The distinction 
between feasible outcomes and actual equilibrium outcomes is funda-
mental to neoclassical economic analysis, yet KWGT fail to make this 
distinction when they state their conclusion.93 This error is fatal to their 
critique of the Actavis Inference.94 
                                                                                                                             
89. See KWGT, supra note 10, at 90 (asserting that a litigation cost benchmark would 
not “encourage settlements that would increase consumer welfare”); see also Joshua D. 
Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements 
After Actavis: Three Questions and Proposed Answers (Oct. 10, 2014) (on file with authors) 
(making a closely related claim by reference to consumer welfare). 
90. KWGT, supra note 10, at 91–93. 
91. Id. at 93. Based on this statement, the KWGT analysis actually justifies a 
stronger version of the Actavis Inference, one that would apply to reverse payments smaller 
than litigation costs. 
92. We follow KWGT here and refer to settlements that are preferred to litigation by 
both Brand and Generic as “feasible” settlements. In the economics literature, including the 
literature on bargaining and negotiations, this concept is referred to as “individually 
rational.”    
93. In Actavis and Error Costs, we made a similar critique of a recent paper by 
Harris, Murphy, Willig and Wright, who make a similar point to KWGT’s. See Barry C. 
Harris, Kevin M. Murphy, Robert D. Willig & Matthew B. Wright, Activating Actavis: A 
More Complete Story, ANTITRUST, Spring 2014, at 83 [hereinafter HMWW]. Both HMWW 
and KWGT are premised on an expansion of the parties’ settlement range, and both criticize 
the Actavis Inference for banning hypothetical settlements that would not actually be 
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Propositions #2 and #3 show that when the reverse payment exceeds 
the Brand’s prospective litigation costs, then the settlement is 
anticompetitive under Benchmark #2 in Actavis. Moreover, Proposition 
#3 shows that if the Actavis Inference were weakened, or eliminated, 
then the parties would choose settlements with lower consumer and total 
welfare in our models, and hence in the KWGT model as well.95 The 
reason is that allowing a larger reverse payment leads to an equilibrium 
settlement with later generic entry, which harms consumers and reduces 
total welfare; in the limit if all reverse payments are allowed, then the 
equilibrium settlement will delay competition until the patent expires.96 
Thus, once we properly restrict attention to equilibrium settlements, it 
becomes clear that the presence of multiple generic entrants does not 
provide a reason to weaken or eliminate the Actavis Inference, regardless 
of whether consumer welfare or total welfare is the antitrust goal. 
 
KWGT Claim #2: The Actavis Inference will “encourage 
litigants to use other, potentially more 
 inefficient means to settle.” 
This claim is a bare assertion, which makes its first appearance in 
the final sentence of the KWGT paper. The KWGT economic model does 
not analyze or mention “inefficient means to settle,” and we are unable to 
find any arguments or facts in the KWGT paper that address this point 
or support this claim. Nonetheless, we pause to address this concern.  
If the Actavis Inference applied only to cash settlements, as a few 
district courts have mistakenly held (see Part III above), then Brand and 
Generic would indeed be tempted to use noncash payments to transfer 
                                                                                                                             
KWGT making this mistake is that they do distinguish between feasible and equilibrium 
settlements in much of their analysis, yet they fail to do so in their policy conclusions.  
94. By contrast, our model does not support the conclusion that all feasible 
settlements reduce consumer welfare. 
95. These propositions therefore refute KWGT’s claim that “using litigation cost as an 
indicator of an anticompetitive settlement would [not] . . . encourage settlements that would 
increase consumer welfare.” KWGT, supra note 10, at 90. Abandoning the Actavis Inference 
would lead to equilibrium settlements with lower consumer welfare and total welfare than 
ones that would obtain under the Actavis Inference.  
96. In fact KWGT state exactly this fact about equilibrium settlements in the course 
of their analysis: “If there are no legal constraints upon settlement, then the multiple entry 
model predicts a set of equilibrium settlements that do not allow early entry and in which 
reverse payments X are 1.5 to more than 18 times the Brand’s litigation costs.” KWGT 
Working Paper, supra note 10, at 12. All such settlements reduce consumer and total 
welfare with respect to both Benchmark #1 and Benchmark #2. In their conclusions, 
however, KWGT focus on feasible and not equilibrium settlements and suggest that it is 
lamentable that the Actavis Inference does not permit some hypothetically desirable 
settlements even though these settlements would not arise in equilibrium if the Actavis 
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value from Brand to Generic. Certainly these noncash means of 
transferring value could be inefficient. For example, Brand might issue a 
license to produce another drug on very favorable terms to Generic, even 
though Generic is not the most capable firm to make and sell that drug. 
The inefficiencies caused by these noncash transfers of value could well 
compound the anticompetitive inefficiencies, identified in Propositions #2 
and #3, associated with large and unexplained cash payments. 
The obvious way to avoid encouraging firms to “use other, potentially 
more inefficient means to settle” is to apply the Actavis Inference to all 
forms of consideration, not just cash, as we have explained here and 
previously. Here again, the economic analysis warns against a cramped 
or narrow interpretation of the Actavis Inference, the opposite of what 
KWGT advocate. 
 
KWGT Claim #3: The Actavis Inference will “increase the 
costs of dynamic Type I [false condemnation] errors.” 
This claim, like the first claim, is flatly inconsistent with KWGT’s 
own economic analysis. As we noted above, in their model of multiple 
generic entry, KWGT conclude that “all feasible settlements, including 
those in which there is no reverse payment, generate consumer welfare 
that is lower than the expected welfare net of litigation costs that would 
be produced through litigation.”97 This statement implies that the Actavis 
Inference cannot lead to any false antitrust condemnations in their model 
according to their own analysis. Since all feasible settlements harm 
consumers, any settlement prevented by the Actavis Inference also would 
have harmed consumers. Stopping such a settlement is not an error, but 
rather the correct outcome under antitrust law, under the consumer 
welfare standard employed by the Actavis Court.  
Furthermore, we have shown that KWGT’s Claim #3 is false in our 
more general economic model. Our Propositions #2 and #3 establishes 
that in our models (and thus in the KWGT model) the Actavis Inference 
will not generate any false antitrust condemnations. In the models, any 
settlement with a reverse payment in excess of litigation cost is indeed 
anticompetitive. Brand will only pay more than its litigation cost if doing 
so reduces the period of time during which consumers benefit from 
competition by multiple generic firms. In addition, our Proposition #3 
shows that weakening the Actavis Inference would lead to outcomes that 
are worse for consumers. 
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V.  THE ROLE OF PATENT VALIDITY AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ACTAVIS 
INFERENCE 
We now discuss the role of determinations of patent validity (or 
infringement98) in the antitrust assessment of the legality of reverse 
payment settlements. The Supreme Court clearly stated that “it is 
normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust 
question.”99 Nonetheless, trial courts handling these antitrust cases will 
continue to be faced with evidence and arguments regarding patent 
validity or invalidity. Perhaps the starkest instances arise in antitrust 
cases where, subsequent to the reverse-payment settlement in question, 
but prior to the resolution of the antitrust case, the relevant patent is 
litigated and found to be either valid or invalid. For example, in the Cipro 
case, the patent was subsequently found valid,100 and in the Provigil case 
the patent was later found invalid.101 A second situation arises if the 
antitrust court is asked to relitigate the patent case to assess its likely 
outcome, an unappetizing task disparaged as “turducken” by one court of 
appeals.102 
Our main message here is straightforward: the correct antitrust 
analysis must be based on what was reasonably known to the parties 
about patent validity and infringement at the time they entered into their 
settlement. Stated differently, the antitrust analysis of a reverse-payment 
settlement should be made on an ex ante basis, as of the date of the 
settlement itself. A subsequent finding of patent invalidity does not imply 
that there was an antitrust violation, regardless of the presence or size of 
a reverse payment. Nor does a subsequent finding of patent infringement 
imply there was no antitrust violation despite a large and unexplained 
reverse payment.103 
                                                                                                                             
98. Our analysis in this Part generally applies to noninfringement, but we focus on 
validity for simplicity. 
99. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
100.  In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 188, 197 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (reporting unsuccessful post-settlement challenges to the patent including, 
inter alia, Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
101.  Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-CV-2768, 2011 WL 6090696 (E.D. Pa. 
2011), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding patent invalid and unenforceable, by 
same judge considering antitrust challenges to the settlement); see also In re Tamoxifen 
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing instance where patent 
was invalidated by district court before settlement). 
102.  FTC v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d on other 
grounds, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
103.  In Appendix B, we develop this point further, presenting an error-cost analysis 
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The Supreme Court adopted an ex ante approach in Actavis, which 
held that settling by paying to avoid the risk of competition, i.e., the risk 
of losing the patent case, is an antitrust violation.104 That risk is assessed 
at the time of the settlement; it would make no sense to evaluate such 
“risk” after the patent has been found valid or invalid. The very notion of 
“risk” here is an ex ante concept. 
The best information the antitrust court has regarding the parties’ ex 
ante beliefs about patent validity and infringement is likely to come from 
the terms of the agreement they reached.105 A large and unexplained 
payment is a strong signal that the patent holder had substantial doubts 
that it would win the underlying patent litigation. As put by the Court: 
“In a word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a 
workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to 
conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”106 
Moreover, as we noted in Activating Actavis, even a reliable 
determination that a patentee was likely to win its patent case does not 
answer the liability question, since a patentee may make a large 
payment to eliminate even a small probability of losing its case.107  
To illustrate why the antitrust analysis of patent settlements must be 
done on an ex ante basis, consider a garden variety patent license in 
which Firm A licenses its patent to its sole rival, Firm B. Under this 
license, Firm B pays running royalties to Firm A based on the number of 
units Firm B produces. The patent license raises Firm B’s marginal costs 
and thus raises the prices charged by both firms to consumers. Suppose 
that Firm A’s patent is subsequently found to be invalid. Unquestionably, 
the patent license led to higher prices, which harmed consumers. 
Unquestionably, Firm A derived benefits from a patent that was later 
found invalid. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that the patent 
license violated antitrust law. To do so would open up most patent 
licenses to subsequent antitrust challenge, a highly undesirable outcome 
                                                                                                                             
flawed, since it starts from an incorrect notion of what constitute Type I and Type II errors 
in the antitrust assessment of a patent settlement.  
104.  The Court wrote that settling “to prevent the risk of competition” is “the 
relevant anti-competitive harm.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. The European Court of Justice 
has also adopted an ex ante approach, writing that “the anti-competitive nature of 
[AstraZeneca’s] acts must be evaluated at the time those acts were committed.” 
AstraZeneca v. Commission, Case C-45710 P, December 6, 2012. 
105.  Information about patent strength known to the parties at the time of 
settlement, such as a prior judicial determination of validity or internal analyses identifying 
the weakness of the patent, might be a useful additional source of inference for the fact-
finder in cases where the facts evincing payment are ambiguous. 
106.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37.  
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and one that is obviously contrary to antitrust law.108 The only exception 
would be one where the patentee knew from the onset that the patent 
was invalid.109 
The antitrust analysis of this garden variety license is done on an ex 
ante basis, based on the information available to Firm A and Firm B 
when they signed the license. Presumably, Firm B only agreed to pay 
running royalties to Firm A because Firm B believed there was some 
chance that Firm A would win if Firm A sued Firm B for patent 
infringement. Indeed, we would expect the negotiated royalty rate to 
reflect the strength of Firm A’s patent. There is no basis to believe that 
Firm B paid “too high” a running royalty rate, and thus no basis to 
believe that the license harmed consumers. A subsequent determination 
that the patent is invalid does not change the proper, ex ante, antitrust 
analysis of the license. This same principle applies to reverse-payment 
settlements evaluated using the Actavis Inference.  
There is an important lesson here for courts. The “turducken” 
approach of litigating the patent is not just costly, but largely beside the 
point when determining whether a reverse payment settlement violates 
the antitrust laws. The antitrust question has to do with whether 
competition was likely to have been reduced by the settlement, based on 
the information available to the parties at the time they settled their 
patent litigation. Relying instead on subsequent patent validity findings 
carries a heavy risk of hindsight bias. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We believe that our discussion has made several propositions clear.  
First, nothing in either the Actavis decision or common sense 
indicates that noncash payments should be immunized from the Actavis 
Inference. To immunize such payments would completely undermine the 
Supreme Court’s ruling. To be sure, noncash payments might sometimes 
be more difficult to evaluate, but federal judges have considerable 
experience in placing value on goods or services other than cash.  
Second, no-authorized-generic provisions are a noncash form of value 
transfer that should count just as much as cash in determining the 
existence of a payment for delay. Indeed, to the extent that a no-AG 
provision differs from a cash payment, it is more anticompetitive. The 
                                                                                                                             
108.  See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 
2003) (pay-for-delay settlement not unlawful per se simply because patent in question was 
subsequently found invalid: “We hold that the mere subsequent invalidity of the patent does 
not render the patent irrelevant to the appropriate antitrust analysis.”). 
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cash payment is simply a wealth transfer from the brand to the generic, 
while the no-AG provision operates as an additional anticompetitive 
market division. 
Third, the Actavis Inference is at least as important when there are 
multiple generic entrants than when there is just a single generic 
entrant. This comports with common sense, and we have established this 
conclusion in a suitable economic model.  
Fourth, litigating the patent is not only costly and unnecessary for 
the antitrust case, but largely beside the point and carries with it a 
substantial risk of hindsight bias. A large reverse payment is a surer sign 
of antitrust violation than a finding of patent invalidity. And, a finding of 
patent validity should not immunize the parties from antitrust violation.  
Finally, our analysis indicates that the Actavis Inference is not the 
only way for a plaintiff to prove its case. The Actavis Inference will fail to 
capture some anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements with payments 
less than anticipated litigation costs. This indicates that plaintiffs should 
be given the opportunity to establish through other means that a patent 
settlement is anticompetitive even if the Actavis Inference does not 
apply.  
This conclusion is consistent the Actavis decision. Nothing in the 
decision immunizes from antitrust scrutiny settlements involving 
payment less than anticipated litigation costs. An antitrust challenge to 
such a settlement could succeed, without the benefit of the Actavis 
Inference, if the antitrust plaintiff is able to establish through other 
means that the settlement led to a delay in generic entry, and thus is 
anticompetitive. In other words, the Actavis decision did not create a safe 
harbor for settlements involving reverse payments smaller than 
anticipated litigation costs. 
 
APPENDIX A: ECONOMIC MODEL WITH MULTIPLE 
GENERIC ENTRANTS 
 
We denote the Brand by B and the Generic, a first ANDA filer, by G. 
The remaining patent lifetime is T. For simplicity, we assume no time 
discounting. Brand places a probability P on winning the patent 
litigation, i.e., that the patent will be found valid and infringed. Both 
Brand and Generic are assumed to be risk neutral. The exclusivity period 
for the first ANDA filer is denoted by H (for half-year). Generic receives 
this exclusivity period if it litigates and wins, or if it settles.  
Monopoly profits for Brand are denoted by   . Duopoly profits for 
Brand are denoted by     Profits for Brand following multiple generic 
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profits for Generic are     Profits for Generic following multiple generic 
entry are denoted by     All profit and consumer surplus measures are 
flows per unit time. We assume that the combined profits of Brand and 
Generic are higher under monopoly than duopoly, and higher under 
duopoly than under free entry:                  .  
Consumer surplus is higher under free entry,    , than under 
duopoly,   , and higher under duopoly than under monopoly,   , i.e., 
        . Total welfare, i.e., profits plus consumer surplus, is higher 
under free entry than under duopoly, and higher under duopoly than 
under monopoly.  
Brand and Generic can settle or litigate. Litigation costs for Brand 
and Generic are    and   . A settlement involves two parameters: the 
entry date E for Generic and a reverse payment X made by Brand to 
Generic.110 Since we are interested in the impact of allowing for multiple 
generic entry, we look at settlements that leave sufficient time for 
multiple generic entry to occur. This requires that      . If     
  there is no time prior to patent expiration for entry by other generics, 
so the monopoly-duopoly model and analysis apply. 
 
SETTLEMENT       WITH MULTIPLE GENERIC ENTRANTS: 180-DAY 
DUOPOLY 
In this section we present and analyze our 180-day duopoly model of 
multiple generic entry in which we assume that Generic receives the 
exclusivity period H following a settlement, with additional generic firms 
entering the market after that exclusivity period ends. In practice, in 
many or even most cases, the assumption that further generic entry will 
occur following a settlement and the 180-day exclusivity period is 
empirically correct. For example, in five of the seven drugs with pay-for-
delay litigation discussed in Part IV, there were additional entrants 
poised to enter, prior to patent expiration, following the expiration of the 
180 days. In the remaining two, the first filer’s entry date was 180 days 
prior to patent expiration, and no additional pre-expiration entry was 
possible.  
This is not the assumption made by KWGT. They assume instead 
that there is no additional generic entry prior to patent expiration 
following a settlement, even if there is time left on the patent for such 
entry to occur after the end of the 180 days. Instead, they assume there is 
                                                                                                                             
110 The reverse payment X in our model should be interpreted as net of any 
consideration flowing from Generic to Brand. In the language of Actavis, X - CB is the 
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durable duopoly. We consider that situation in our durable duopoly model 
subsequently. 
Table 1 gives the expected time spent in monopoly, duopoly, and free 
entry during the patent period under litigation and under the settlement 
      in the 180-day duopoly model. 
 
Table 1: 180-day 
Duopoly Model 
Expected Period of Time 
 Litigation Settlement 
Monopoly PT E 
Duopoly (1-P) H H 
Free entry T - PT - (1 - P)H = 
(1-P)(T - H) 
T - E - H 
 
Combined Profits from Eliminating Competition 
If Brand and Generic bargain efficiently without any antitrust 
constraints other than the scope-of-the-patent test, they will select E to 
maximize their combined profits, with X determining how those profits 
are split between Brand and Generic. This implies that    , so generic 
entry does not occur prior to the expiration of the patent. This yields 




The additional profits available from settling and preventing generic 
entry for the lifetime of the patent are the difference between these two 




The first term represents the extra profits from monopoly rather than 
duopoly, in the event that the patent does not hold up in litigation. The 
second term reflects the extra profits from duopoly rather than free entry, 
after the 180-day exclusivity period ends, in the event that the patent 
does not hold up in litigation. The final two terms are the savings on 
litigation costs from settling. The first term is unchanged from the 
monopoly to duopoly model. The second term only arises with multiple 
generic entrants, which lowers the profits to Brand and Generic in 
comparison with duopoly. Since this term is positive, we have: 
Proposition #1: The incentives of Brand and Generic to enter into an 
anticompetitive settlement delaying generic entry are greater with 
multiple generic entrants than with one generic entrant. 
PTMB + (1-P)H(DB +DG )+ (1-P)(T -H )(FB +FG )-CB -CG











 Brand Payoff from Settlement vs. Litigation 
Brand’s payoff from settling on terms  is  
. Brand’s expected payoff from 
litigating is . If we observe a 
settlement, we may reasonably infer that it was better for Brand than 




Simplifying, this inequality can be written as  
 
                                              .            (1) 
 
The first term on the left-hand side represents the expected value to 
Brand of delaying entry. The expected length of the delay is      and 
the value to Brand of delay is      . This is the value of delay because 
a later entry date does not affect the length H of the duopoly period. As 
shown in Table 1, later entry prolongs the initial monopoly phase and 
shrinks the final, free-entry phase.  
The second term of the left-hand side represents an additional value 
to Brand of settling. So far as we are aware, this effect has not previously 
been identified. Under settlement, Brand will surely benefit from the 
partial protection associated with duopoly rather than free entry. This 
protection has value . Under litigation, Brand will only 
receive this partial protection if it loses the patent litigation. In expected 
value terms, this partial protection is worth . 
Settlement gives an additional value equal to the difference between 
these two terms, namely .111 
The right-hand side, , is the extra out-of-pocket cost of 
settlement vs. litigation.  
                                                                                                                             
111.  Another way to understand this non-intuitive term is to ask how increasing the 
exclusivity period, H, affects Brand’s incentive to settle. If Brand settles, longer exclusivity 
is valuable to Brand for sure. However, if Brand settles, longer exclusivity is valuable to 
Brand only if it loses the litigation. Increasing H thus tilts Brand toward settling.  























+ (T - E - H)F
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Comparison with Monopoly to Duopoly Model 
In our previous model, there was no additional entry following the 
exclusivity period, so . Making this substitution, the inequality 
above becomes .  
The prospect of multiple generic entry increases the benefit to Brand 
of a settlement that delays entry, for two reasons. First, delaying entry 
gives Brand extra profits of , which is greater than 
. This reflects the additional harm to competition 
associated with delayed entry in the case of multiple generic entry. 
Second, settlement allows Brand to receive duopoly protection with 
certainty rather than just when it loses the patent litigation. This 
produces an extra settlement value of . Note that this 
value is independent of the entry date E. 
 
Actavis Inference with Multiple Generic Entrants: Large Payments 
Imply Less Competition from Multiple Generic Entrants 
We now show that the Brand will only be willing to make a reverse 
payment in excess of its prospective litigation cost if the settlement 
results in less competition (in expectation) from multiple generics. Thus, 
in the multiple entry model, large reverse payments continue to be 
payments to delay competition in that sense. 
Under the settlement, consumers benefit from multiple generic 
competitors for a time period of length      . Under litigation 
consumers benefit from multiple generic competitors for an expected time 
period of           . The settlement reduces the expected amount of 
time during which consumers benefit from multiple generic competitors if 
and only if                 . This can be written as 
 
       .                                        (2) 
 
Suppose we observe a settlement with a reverse payment in excess of 
the Brand’s litigation costs,     . Using inequality (1) above, this 
implies  
 
                                                                         (3)  
 
If     , then        which implies that inequality (2) is 
satisfied. Alternatively if     , then we can rewrite inequality (3) as 
                       , where all of the terms in this 
expression are positive. This in turn can be rewritten as 
  
    
 
     








) > X -C
B
(E -PT )(MB - FB )
(E -PT )(MB -DB)
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The right-hand side is greater than unity. Therefore we must have 
       , which is exactly inequality (2) that we were seeking to 
show. Therefore, we have established: 
 
Proposition #2: Any settlement with a reverse payment in excess of 
Brand’s litigation costs must restrict competition in the sense of reducing 
the expected period of time during which consumers benefit from 
competition by multiple generic entrants. 
 
Allowing Larger Reverse Payments Harms Consumers and Total 
Welfare 
Above we showed in this model that Brand would not make payments 
in excess of its litigation costs other than to limit competition from 
multiple generics. Here we study the effect of payment size upon 
consumer welfare. In particular, we show that consumers are harmed if 
we raise the size of the allowable reverse payment above CB. 
Let      be the maximum reverse payment that does not trigger the 
Actavis Inference. Our monopoly to duopoly model suggested that      
should be set at the level of Brand’s litigation cost,   . This also is what 
Justice Breyer concluded in the Actavis decision.  
We use the concept of monotonic bargaining from Edlin and 
Reichelstein (1996).112 Monotonic bargaining means that if the 
bargaining space increases, neither party winds up with less profit under 
the bargaining outcome. We now prove: 
 
Proposition #3: If settlement bargaining between Brand and Generic 
is efficient and monotonic, and if the legal rule         leads to entry 
before T, then consumer welfare and total welfare will both be lower for 
any legal rule         that relaxes the Actavis Inference than for the 
rule        . 
 
Proof. An increase in      above CB increases the set of feasible 
settlements, so with monotonic bargaining, neither party can end up with 
lower profit than they would if        .  
                                                                                                                             
112.  Aaron Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and 
Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478, 482 (1996) (defining a bargaining sharing rule 
as monotonic if “the payoff each party receives from bargaining is (weakly) increasing in the 
size of the renegotiation surplus”). In the context of this paper, the legal rule defines a profit 
possibility frontier and space of firm profits that weakly exceed firm profits under litigation. 
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Let         be the entry date and reverse payment that Brand and 
Generic settle on under the legal rule        , and assume that 
    . Efficient bargaining and      imply that      . (Absent the 
legal constraint on payment size, the Brand would trade a higher 
payment for an agreement to delay beyond    that together increased 
both parties’ profits.)  
We will compare the settlement         with the settlement induced 
by any relaxed legal rule       
     . Let  
   denote the entry date 
they settle on given this relaxed rule. We now show that       . If 
     , then       , since     . Alternatively, if      , then 
efficient bargaining implies that the reverse payment will equal the 
maximum    . Given that       , the Brand requires some       to 
achieve the same profit as it achieves under the settlement        . If 
bargaining is weakly monotonic, then          , because the Brand 
cannot get less profit under the relaxed antitrust rule       
   than it 
did under the more stringent rule       
 .  
Observe that consumer surplus is a decreasing function of E, since 
                                            
and      . Therefore, the later entry date  
   under the relaxed rule 
        reduces consumer surplus below the level achieved when 
       . Later entry also reduces total welfare, since total welfare is 
lower under monopoly than free entry. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition #3 tells us that as      increases, the parties move out 
the Ray of Delay (now possibly a wobbly curve) until    , at which 
point they bump into the constraint from patent law that prohibits 
licensing restrictions that extend beyond the lifetime of the patent. For 
large enough values of     , the negotiated settlement involves delay by 
Generic until T and further increases in      will not affect the 
equilibrium outcome. 
Proposition #3 also tells us that settlements that we would observe 
with      injure consumers relative to Benchmark #2, the alternative 
settlement benchmark. In particular, consider any equilibrium 
settlement       with     . Such a settlement would only emerge 
under a relaxed rule, i.e., on the parties’ belief that          . The 
settlement that would be chosen instead given the legal rule         
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 Large Payments Imply Lower Consumer Welfare than Litigation 
Proposition #2 does not guarantee that a settlement with      has 
lower consumer welfare compared to litigation. In theory, there exist 
settlements with      that have higher consumer welfare compared to 
litigation. 
The source of this theoretical possibility is the extra component of 
Brand’s benefit from settlement discussed above,          . As a 
consequence, if Brand has no bargaining power, it is willing to accept a 
settlement date      to capture that benefit. In particular, if     , 
Brand prefers settlement if and only if        
     
     
  . 
As for consumers, later entry lowers consumer welfare. Consumers 
require earlier entry, compared to the monopoly-duopoly case, to be 
indifferent between settlement and litigation. In particular, consumers 
prefer settlement if and only if        
     
     
  . 
The question thus arises: do there exist settlements with      that 
are preferred by both Brand and consumers to litigation? Such 
settlements cannot exist if the earliest entry date that Brand prefer to 
litigation would make consumers worse off than litigation. Using the two 
expressions derived just above, we have shown: 
 
Proposition #4a: Any settlement with      that is acceptable to 
Brand will reduce consumer welfare relative to litigation, provided that          
     
     
 
     
     
.  
 
Both of these ratios are less than unity. The left-hand side measures 
how valuable is duopoly relative to monopoly for Brand, above Brand’s 
free-entry profits. The right-hand side measures how valuable free entry 
is to consumers compared with duopoly, relative to its value compared to 
monopoly.  
This condition is likely satisfied in practice. A rough estimate can be 
made using data from a recent FTC study, which evaluated the effect of 
AGs on drug maker revenues.113 The FTC used wholesale expenditures as 
a proxy for Brand and Generic revenues.114 The FTC estimated relative 
revenue during duopoly and free entry, compared to monopoly, for a large 
set of drugs experiencing generic entry. On average, Brand retains an 
                                                                                                                             
113.  See generally FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND 
LONG-TERM IMPACT (2011). 
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estimated 52% of pre-entry revenue during duopoly.115 This means that 
the left-hand side must be less than 0.52.116  
Wholesale expenditures can also be used to construct an estimate of 
the welfare increase in duopoly and free entry compared to monopoly. 
The main source of increased welfare is reduced outlay for drugs. Based 
on FTC figures, during duopoly, purchasers save 14% of the pre-entry 
price.117 In free entry, purchasers save at least 53%.118 Under the 
assumption that quantities are unchanged, and hence the reduced outlay 
exactly captures the welfare increase,119 the right-hand side is at least 
(53% – 14%)/53% = 0.74, and the inequality is satisfied. 
These calculations are conservative in two further respects. First, 
they assume that Brand launches an AG during Generic’s exclusivity—
i.e., that the “duopoly” period includes an AG, in addition to the branded 
product and independent generic. If Brand agrees to a settlement with a 
no-AG provision during the 180 days, the inequality widens because 
   and    both fall. Second, the FTC figures assume that Brand receives 
all of the revenue and profit from the AG.120 If Brand receives only part, 
then    falls, again widening the inequality.121 Finally, we note that if 
Brand has significant bargaining power then it will be able to bargain for 
later entry that hurts consumers more. 
 
                                                                                                                             
115.  Id. at 108 (reporting Brand relative wholesale expenditure of 0.52 during 
exclusivity). All estimates are with an AG, unweighted and (where relevant) with full 
controls. 
116.  The bound of 0.52 would be achieved if Brands profits under free entry were 
zero and if Brand profit margin under monopoly and duopoly were equivalent. 
117.  As noted above, Brand’s relative wholesale expenditure during duopoly is 0.52. 
The corresponding Generic figure is 0.34. See id. at 59 tbl.3–7 (reporting 0.70 without AG, 
and a 52.0% reduction with an AG; 0.70 * (1 – 0.520) = 0.34). The resulting savings is 1.00 – 
0.52 – 0.34 = 0.14. 
118.  Brand’s relative wholesale expenditure during free entry is 0.17. Id. at 108. The 
corresponding Generic figure is 0.15. See id. at 106 tbl.6–4 (reporting 0.31 without AG, and 
a 52.5% reduction with an AG; 0.31 * (1 – 0.525) = 0.15). The share of later entrants is not 
separately reported by the FTC, but inspection of an accompanying graph reporting 
contemporaneous shares demonstrates that their combined share is smaller than Generic’s 
share. See id. 104 fig.6–3 (reporting later entrants’ combined share to be smaller than 
Generic in every period). The resulting savings is at least 1.00 – 0.17 – 0.15 – 0.15 = 0.53. 
119.  This assumption is conservative, to the extent that quantities would be 
expected to increase as prices fall. This assumption overstates the right-hand side to the 
extent that a post-entry cessation of Brand marketing puts downward pressure on quantity. 
120.  Id. at 61 n.52 (“Here, all AGs are treated as if they are marketed by a 
subsidiary of the brand-name company.”). 
121.  To be more precise, a decrease in DB lowers our upper bound on the left hand 
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SETTLEMENT       WITH MULTIPLE GENERIC ENTRANTS: DURABLE 
DUOPOLY 
In this section we present and analyze our durable duopoly model of 
multiple generic entry, in which we assume that no additional generic 
entry occurs following a settlement, even after the first generic entrant’s 
180-day exclusivity period ends. Duopoly is therefore significantly more 
durable in the case of settlement than in the 180-day duopoly model 
above. This is the assumption made by KWGT. None of the drugs 
discussed in Part IV fit this pattern. Nevertheless, this pattern is 
plausible under the right conditions, and could occur if subsequent 
generics do not find it profitable to enter given that they can be sued for 
patent infringement and will never enjoy any period of exclusivity. 
However, as noted above, in practice in most cases multiple generic entry 
does occur after the 180-day exclusivity period granted to the settling 
generic ends. 
Table 2 gives the expected time spent in monopoly, duopoly, and free 
entry during the patent period under litigation and under the settlement 




Expected Period of Time 
 Litigation Settlement 
Monopoly PT E 
Duopoly (1 – P) H T – E 
Free entry T – PT – (1 – P)H = 
(1 – P)(T – H) 
0 
 
Joint Profits from Eliminating Competition 
Now there is an additional benefit to Brand and Generic associated 
with settlement, since settling prevents free entry from occurring prior to 
the expiration of the patent. This implies that Proposition #1 also holds 
in the model with durable duopoly following settlement. 
 
Brand Payoff from Settlement vs. Litigation 
Brand’s payoff from settling on terms  is now 
. This is the payoff in the previous model plus the 
amount . This extra amount represents the 
difference between duopoly and free entry following generic entry at E 
and the exclusivity period of length H. Brand’s expected payoff from 
litigating is , just as in the 
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previous model. Therefore, there is an additional value of settling in this 
model equal to . Adding this term to the value of 
settling, settlement on terms  implies that 
 . 
The three terms of the left-hand side reflect the benefits to Brand 
from the settlement. The first two terms are the same as above. The third 
term is an additional anticompetitive effect of the settlement that accrues 
to Brand. 
 
Comparison with Monopoly to Duopoly Model 
Now the prospect of multiple generic entry increases the benefits of a 
settlement that delays entry, for the two reasons described above plus a 
new reason. The new reason is represented by the final term of the right-
hand side of the inequality above. As just noted, this term represents the 
difference between duopoly and free entry following generic entry at E 
and the exclusivity period of length H.  
 
Actavis Inference with Multiple Generic Entrants 
If settlement precludes entry by additional generics until the patent 
expires, it follows immediately that settlement reduces the expected 
period of time when consumers benefit from multiple generic competitors. 
Therefore, the analog to Proposition #2 is immediate. 
 
Allowing Larger Reverse Payments Harms Consumers and Total 
Welfare 
The proof of Proposition #3 applies equally in the model where 
duopoly is durable following settlement but not following litigation. All 
that we needed was that consumer surplus and total welfare decline with 
E. 
 
Large Payments Imply Lower Consumer Welfare than Litigation 
The analogue to Proposition #4a in the durable duopoly model 
follows:  
 
Proposition #4b: In the durable duopoly model, any settlement with 
     that is acceptable to Brand will reduce consumer welfare relative 
to litigation, provided that 
     
     
 
     
     
  . 
 
 





 [E, X ]
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In contrast to Proposition #4a, either of these ratios may exceed 
unity. As before, the condition is likely satisfied in practice. A rough 
estimate can be made using the same method, assumptions, and FTC 
data discussed above. The right-hand side is at least (53% – 14%)/14% = 
2.79.122 The left-hand side is less than 52%/(100% – 52%) = 1.08,123 and 
thus the inequality is satisfied by a comfortable margin. Once again, 
these calculations are conservative in the respects discussed above. 
 
BARGAINING POWER, BARGAINING RANGE AND THE ACTAVIS INFERENCE 
Antitrust defendants would prefer a world in which antitrust 
violations from reverse payment settlements are per se legal so long as 
the settlements permit entry after T. Actavis made clear, however, that 
pay for delay is illegal and so the question becomes when it is reasonable 
to infer that a reverse payment settlement involves pay to avoid or delay 
competition not just payment to avoid litigation cost.  
Here, we explore the relationship between the bargaining range, 
bargaining strength and reductions in competition.  
We begin with the simple Monopoly-Duopoly framework of our 
Activating Actavis paper and move on to consider the multiple entrant 
models introduced above. 
 
Monopoly-Duopoly Model 
Consider the monopoly-duopoly model of Activating Actavis. Let 
      be the entry date that makes Brand indifferent between litigation 
and settlement with payment X. For simplicity, we will usually suppress 
the argument X and just write   .  
 The expected length of monopoly and duopoly periods for settlement 





Expected Period of Time 
 Litigation Settlement 
Monopoly      
Duopoly            
 
                                                                                                                             
122.  As before, this lower bound assumes constant quantities across the three states. 
Accounting for quantity changes could make the right hand side significantly larger because 
the quantity effect could be much larger for the steep price decline from duopoly to free 
entry than the more modest one from monopoly to duopoly.  
123.  Much as before, this calculation assumes simply that the profit margin is lower 
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A settlement shifts time period      from duopoly to monopoly. 
Brand pays X and saves    in litigation cost. Thus, Brand is indifferent 
between settlement and litigation if  
 
                   . 
 
If       we see that      . Brand is (just) willing to pay    to 
settle with a duopoly period equal in length to the expected duopoly 
period under litigation.  
Next consider Generic. Let       be the entry date that makes 
Generic indifferent between litigation and settlement with payment X. In 
the settlement, Generic receives X and saves    in litigation cost. Generic 
is willing to accept later entry to receive the payment and save litigation 
cost. Generic is indifferent between litigation and settlement if  
 
              , or       




Therefore, in exchange for a payment of     , Generic would be 
willing to delay entry by an (expected) length of time equal to 
     
  
. This 
is the (expected) period of time over which duopoly is replaced by 
monopoly under a settlement that Generic found indifferent to litigation.  
Summarizing, if the reverse payment equals Brand’s litigation cost, 
Brand prefers settlement to litigation so long as     , and Generic 
prefers settlement to litigation so long as      
     
  
. So Generic 
and Brand bargain over entry dates in the “bargaining range” given by: 
 
                                        




The greater is Brand’s bargaining power, the later will be the 
negotiated entry date, within this range. If Brand has all of the 
bargaining power, the negotiated entry date will be    
     
  
  If 
Generic has all of the bargaining power, the negotiated entry date will be 
     
This analysis shows that the Actavis Inference is highly favorable to 
defendants, in the following specific sense. If Brand has no bargaining 
power, the Actavis Inference is perfectly accurate in this model. However, 
if Brand has any bargaining power at all, the Actavis Inference will 
generate no false antitrust condemnations but will generate some false 
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We can make this statement more precise. Brand’s bargaining power 
is defined by k, where the negotiated entry date is given by   
           . A value of     means that Brand has no bargaining 
power and the negotiated entry date is the earliest one that is acceptable 
to Brand, namely    which equals   . Likewise, a value of     means 
that Brand has all of the bargaining power and the negotiated entry date 
is the latest one that is acceptable to Generic, namely    which equals 
   
    
  
. If Brand’s bargaining power is k, and if Brand makes a 
payment to Generic equal to   , then the negotiated entry date is given 
by     




Proposition #5: If Brand has no bargaining power at all, then the 
Actavis Inference is perfectly accurate in identifying anticompetitive 
settlements. If Brand has some bargaining power, the Actavis Inference 
generates no false condemnations but some false acquittals. 
 
We have not previously emphasized this point in our joint writings, 
but the Actavis Inference with a litigation cost benchmark is favorable to 
defendants because by design it minimizes false condemnations without 
concern for false acquittals. The Actavis Inference is not designed to 
catch all payments for delay, only the ones where we are sure that there 
is no false condemnation, regardless of Brand’s bargaining power, and we 
are sure when     .  
This fact should give the courts significant comfort in applying the 
Actavis Inference even in cases where defendants try to prove some 
possible complication that might (if true) make the Inference 
inapplicable. The false acquittals under the Actavis Inference are not a 
reason to abandon the Actavis Inference, because doing that would only 
lead to settlements that are more anticompetitive, as shown in our 
Proposition #3. Instead, the false acquittals might provide a reason to 
strengthen the Actavis Inference or to allow proof of delay from other 
evidence in cases where the reverse payment is less than litigation costs.  
 
 Multiple Generic Entry Models 
 
An analysis parallel to the preceding analysis can be done for the two 
multiple generic entry models discussed above. The possibility of multiple 
generic entry after litigation (or settlement) moves Brand’s earliest 
acceptable entry date    earlier and Generic’s latest acceptable entry 
date    later than in the monopoly-duopoly model. Thus, the bargaining 
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It continues to be the case, regardless of Brand’s bargaining power, 
that settlements with payments in excess of    involve a reduction in 
competition from multiple entrants as compared with litigation, as shown 
in our Proposition #2, and reduce consumer welfare as shown in 
Proposition #3. Hence, the Actavis Inference has no false positives, just 
as in the monopoly-duopoly model. Furthermore, it continues to be the 
case that when Brand has some bargaining power, settlements, even ones 
with payments no larger than   , may involve reductions in competition 
and consumer welfare. Unlike the monopoly-duopoly model, even when 
Brand has no bargaining power, settlements with payments less than    
may involve reductions in competition and consumer welfare. 
In equilibrium in the model, false acquittals easily arise, especially if 
Brand has significant bargaining power but even if Brand has no 
bargaining power. As noted above, this is not a reason to weaken or 
abandon the Actavis Inference. If anything, it is a reason to provide 
plaintiffs an opportunity to establish that a reverse-payment settlement 
is anticompetitive without invoking the Actavis Inference.  
 
APPENDIX B: ERROR-COST ANALYSIS OF ACTAVIS 
INFERENCE 
 
The court is attempting to determine whether a challenged reverse-
payment settlement is or is not anticompetitive. Under the Actavis 
Inference, a “large and unexplained” reverse payment serves as a “test 
statistic” indicating that the settlement is anticompetitive. As we 
explained in Part V, the determination of anticompetitiveness should be 
made based on the ex ante information the parties had when they entered 
into their agreement, not based on an ex post determination of patent 
validity or infringement. 
Two types of errors could in principle arise using the Actavis 
Inference. A false condemnation (Type I Error) arises if the Actavis 
Inference signals that the settlement is anticompetitive when in fact it is 
not. A false acquittal (Type II Error) arises if the Actavis Inference does 





















Error Cost Matrix: Applying the Actavis Inference to 
Settlements Involving Reverse Payments 
 Actavis Inference Applies: 
Reverse Payment Exceeds 
Litigation Costs 
Actavis Inference 






Accurate Finding of  
Antitrust Liability 




Type I Error:  
False Condemnation 




Propositions #2 and #3 establish that there are no false 
condemnations (Type I errors) in our models. Furthermore, as discussed 
in the text, the Actavis Inference does generate false acquittals (Type II 
errors), especially if Brand has significant bargaining power or if there 
are multiple generic entrants. Weakening the Actavis Inference would 
generate more false acquittals. 
KWGT employ a conception of error costs that conflates patent 
adjudication with antitrust adjudication. Their mistake is best illustrated 
by the two-by-two “Error Cost Matrix” in the KWGT Working Paper.124 
The KWGT rows in that matrix are “Patent Valid” and “Patent Invalid.” 
Their columns are “No Antitrust Violation (Scope of the patent test)” and 
“Antitrust Violation (Per se illegal).” Their “true” states of the world (the 
rows) refer to valid and invalid patents, not procompetitive versus 
anticompetitive settlements. Thus, they are not testing the accuracy of 
the Actavis Inference in identifying anticompetitive settlements. This 
fundamental error is fatal to KWGT’s entire analysis and discussion of 
Type I and Type II errors. In particular, KWGT’s mistaken claim that the 
Actavis Inference will “increase the costs of Type I errors” is based on 
their erroneous conception of what the term “Type I error” means in this 
context.  
 
                                                                                                                             
124.  KWGT Working Paper, supra note 10, at 14. 
